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ABUSIVE TAX PRACTICES:
THE 100-YEAR ONSLAUGHT ON THE TAX CODE
Arthur Acevedo*
[The tax evader is] in every respect, an excellent citizen, had not
the laws of his country made that a crime which nature never
meant to be so.
-Adam Smith'
I've not in my practice seen penalties be a deterrent factor on any
action that's being taken by a taxpayer.
-N. Jerold Cohen
2
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 26, 2011, forty-one federally elected officials 3 sponsored a bill in
the House of Representatives to terminate the Income Tax Code. If passed, this bill,
touted as the "Tax Code Termination Act,'A would have abolished income taxes
"for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 2015." 5 This bill was never
passed .
In 2013, the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") will mark 100 years. Attacks on
the tax policy generally, and on the Code specifically, have formed part of the
income tax landscape since the enactment of the Code in 1913. For nearly 100
years, taxpayers have engaged in reasonable and unreasonable challenges to
* Arthur Acevedo is an Associate Professor of Law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois.
He received his Juris Doctor, Master of Science in Taxation, and Baccalaureate Science in Commerce degrees
from DePaul University. He also received his certificate as a Certified Public Accountant (Illinois). The author is
grateful to Associate Dean Kathryn J. Kennedy and Professor Jason Kilbom for their valuable comments. The
author also wishes to thank his research assistants Fang Han, Tanya M. Gutierrez, and Kendall L. Rice, and the
research fellows at the John Marshall Law School. The author is grateful to Patricia Mendoza for her comments,
insights, and tireless support.
1. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 898 (R. H.
Campbell & A. S. Skinner eds., 1981) (1776).
2. N. Jerold Cohen, Remarks at Key Issues in Tax Policy: A 2008 Tax Analysts Conference, Tax Shelters
& Penalties: Reasonable Cause, Opinion Letters, and Other Issues (July 25, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/conferences.nsf/KeyLookup/GBRO-7G5KCF?OpenDocument&link=transcript).
3. The bill had forty-one original co-sponsors, and twelve other Representatives have added their names
as co-sponsors on various dates through May 23, 2011, for a total of fifty-three sponsors. Bill Tracking Report for
H.R. 462, 112th Cong. (2011).
4. Tax Code Termination Act, H.R. 462, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).
5. Id. § 2(a).
6. Bill Tracking Report H.R. 462, supra note 3.
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Congress's power to tax. These challenges range from legitimate interpretational
issues, to quasi-legitimate tax shelter issues, to illegitimate tax protester issues.
Taxpayer challenges are motivated by any number of reasons. Some are based on a
desire to equalize the perceived disparity of the income tax laws in relation to a
particular tax position. Others on a desire to pursue aggressive positions in the
absence of explicit authority. Still, some are based on a misplaced belief in the
illegitimacy of the Code. A number of factors combine to create an environment
ripe for taxpayer challenges and for self-executing equalization by taxpayers-
voluntary tax assessments, varying tax preferences, fluctuating tax policies, and
ambiguous language. These factors influence a faction of taxpayers, tax protesters,
and aggressive tax participants to behave in a manner that is questionable and
destructive to the tax policy goals of simplicity, fairness, efficiency, and revenue
sufficiency.7
This article explores the actions taken by tax protesters and aggressive tax
planners, and the response by Congress. It also examines whether Congress has
taken sufficient action to curb abusive taxpayer practices. The thesis of the article
is that Congress's faint-hearted responses to abusive taxpayer conduct are
untimely, inefficient, and ineffective. Congress's weak responses since the
inception of the Code have contributed to a culture of income tax avoidance and a
growing sense of taxpayer frustration with income tax laws.8 Part II examines the
culture of tax avoidance in the U.S. and how this attitude has manifested itself in
our tax jurisprudence. Abusive taxpayer practices are examined from two
ostensibly diverse perspectives, the tax protester, and the aggressive tax planner.
Part III examines the common law tax doctrines and their limited effectiveness in
curbing aggressive tax planning. Part IV examines the relevant statutory responses
by Congress to aggressive tax planning and identifies the limitations of each
section. Part V concludes with two proposals to address abusive taxpayer practices
and calls upon Congress to take affirmative and decisive steps to curb abusive
taxpayer practices. 9
During the first half of the twentieth century, Congress pursued a policy of
restraint and tolerance when dealing with abusive taxpayer practices. Congress
finally enacted a series of statutes in the 1980's aimed at curbing abusive taxpayer
practices. Despite these statutory reforms, certain factions of taxpayers continued
to engage in abusive behaviors.
The list of rebellious taxpayer behavior during the nearly 100 years of the
Code's existence is not limited to the common taxpayer. Individuals of national
prominence provide startling and unexpected examples of errant taxpayer behavior.
Among "the most surprising cases on record is that of the tax specialist, a professor
7. JOSEPH J. MINARIK, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS: TAXATION (David R. Henderson ed., 2d
ed. 2008) (1993), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Taxation.html.
8. For a history of the Tea Party Movement and the evolution of its platform, see Scott Clement, The Tea
Party, Religion and Social Issues, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 23, 2011), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1903/tea-
party-movement-religion-social-issues-conservative-christian.
9. For purposes of this article, "abusive taxpayer practice" includes tax protester activity and aggressive
tax planning activity.
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of taxation in a law school, who pleaded guilty in 1962, in the Federal District
Court in Brooklyn, to failing to file his own tax returns."' Another startling case
involved the "former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Joseph D. Nunan, Jr.,
who received a five-year sentence and a substantial fine for failing to report
160,000 dollars of income during taxable years, including time he served as chief
tax collector of the United States."'1 A recent example includes the appointment of
Timothy Geithner as United States Secretary of the Treasury. 2 Geithner admitted
that he did not pay for Medicare or Social Security while working for the IMF from
2001 to 2004.13 He also admitted he improperly claimed tax deductions and tax
credits. 14 Another example is former Senate majority leader Thomas A. Daschle,
who failed to report $340,000 in income over a three year period. 5 Taxpayer
predisposition to neglect or abuse the Code carries a wide and varied constituency
which includes ordinary citizens,' 6 influential politicians, 17 and multi-national
corporations. 18
Our federally elected officials have undertaken a sworn duty to defend the
Constitution.' 9 By logical extension, this duty includes ensuring that the federal
treasury is not deprived by unscrupulous taxpayer activity. 20 The collective
behavior of tax protesters and aggressive tax planners undermines confidence in
the tax laws, destabilizes the foundations of tax policy, and increases the burden on
effective tax administration.' Moreover, aggressive tax planners' conduct has cost
the federal treasury billions of dollars in lost revenue. The risk of Congress taking a
passive approach to dealing with abusive taxpayer activity include a decrease in
taxpayers' confidence in the tax system, increased administrative difficulties for
the IRS, and the loss of legitimate tax revenues. The question therefore is, what
10. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, TAXES, LOOPHOLES AND MORALS 222 (1963).
11. Richard J. Kovach, Taxes, Loopholes and Morals Revisited. A 1963 Perspective on the Tax Gap, 30
WHITTIER L. REV. 247, 272 (2008).
12. Jonathan Weisman, Geithner's Tax History Muddles Confirmation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123187503629378119.html#articleTabs%3Darticle.
13. Id.
14. See id. (Geithner improperly claimed a business deduction for personal use public utilities and
improperly calculated the dependent care tax deduction. He blamed the incident on faulty advice from his advisor).
15. Janet Novack & Ashlea Ebeling, Taxes: How To Cheat Like a Pro, FORBES, Mar. 2, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0302/030_taxes-cheat-pro.html.
16. See Kellems v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 556 (1972).
17. See Novack, supra note 15 (Thomas A. Daschle); Editorial, Morality and Charlie Rangel's Taxes,
WALL ST. J., July 27, 2009, at A14 (U.S. Representative Charlie Rangel); Margaret Shapiro & Ted Gup, Taxes
Paid, Agnew Says at Ocean City Home, WASH. POST, June 27, 1979, at Cl (U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew).
18. Jesse Drucker, Google *' 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, BLOOMBERG, Oct.
21, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-
to-tax-loopholes.html.
19. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2011) (The Congressional Oath of Office states in relevant part "I . . . do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same .... ).
20. Calling for an abolition of the Income Tax Code, as was done by the fifty-three elected representatives,
borders on reckless and irresponsible action. See Bill Tracking Report H.R. 462, supra note 3.
21. See generally IRS RESPONSE TO THE ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTER MOVEMENT BEFORE THE H. SUBCOMM.
ON THE GOV'T OPERATIONS, 97th Cong. (1981) (report by the Comptroller General), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/f01l02/115485.pdf.
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additional actions, if any, should Congress consider in the face of continuing
abusive practices?
II. A CULTURE OF AVOIDANCE
Judge Learned Hand's position as one of the greatest jurist in American history
is uncontested. His influence reigns supreme in the area of income tax. In 1934,
Learned Hand penned his hallmark statement that
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does
not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid,
or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.22
This succinct, yet powerful statement has influenced taxpayer conduct and
jurisprudence since its pronouncement.
This statement contributes to the enforcement and collection challenges faced
by the IRS. Tax protesters and aggressive tax planners alike have cited to this
language as a justification for their actions. Judge Hand's statement affirms a
philosophy of minimal legal compliance. His statement cloaks tax avoidance
behavior with a legal justification willingly embraced by taxpayers generally, and
tax protesters and aggressive tax planners specifically. Although Judge Hand's
statement rings loud, two issues present themselves. First, the statement is
unnecessary in light of the Supreme Court's earlier decision in United States v.
Isham.23 Second, Congress and the IRS failed to recognize the influence this
statement would have on taxpayer conduct throughout the twentieth century.
In Isham, a taxpayer sought to avoid the application of a stamp tax by
structuring his transaction in the form of a draft instead of a promissory note.24 The
statute in effect at the time imposed a tax of two cents per $100 on checks and
drafts, and a tax of five cents per $100 on promissory notes.25 In form, Isham's
26document was a draft, but in substance it was a promissory note. The United
22. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Apparently Learned
Hand was no fan of the tax code. In an essay in the Yale Law Journal, he wrote:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance
before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception
upon exception-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-leave in
my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed,
purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the
most inordinate expenditure of time.
Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167,169 (1947).
23. 84 U.S. 496 (1873).
24. Id. at 501.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 505.
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States filed a criminal complaint "against E.B. Isham, for issuing [documents]
without a stamp and with intent to evade the provisions of the [tax laws] ....
The United States argued that the instruments were "in essence, promissory
notes' 28 and therefore, subject to the higher tax rate.
The United States Supreme Court framed the issue as whether "a device to
avoid the payment of a stamp duty, and . . . its operation is ... a fraud upon the
revenue." 29 A majority of the Court responded "[t]hat if the device is carried out by
the means of legal forms, it is subject to no legal censure. '30 The Supreme Court
held in favor of Isham and in the process, affirmed the principle of tax avoidance.3
Rather than rely on the precedential value of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Isham, Judge Hand took pen to paper and composed his now famous statement.
Learned Hand's powerful and persuasive statement continues to haunt tax
administrators to this day. From a jurisprudential perspective, Learned Hand's
statement is a marginal addition in light of the Court's earlier statement in Isham.
However, supporters of this statement may argue that Judge Hand reaffirms the
principle of tax avoidance in the post-Code enactment era. Supporters of this
statement can also be expected to argue that the statement extends the principle of
tax avoidance from a criminal context into a civil context. Be that as it may, Judge
Hand's statement is a leviathan for tax administrators. Learned Hand's statement
invites insolence instead of compliance, encourages circumvention instead of
observation, and reinforces the psychology of minimal compliance with the law.32
Learned Hand is not the only judge to endorse tax avoidance. However, no other
judge has influenced tax law as has Learned Hand.33
Equally important, Congress and the IRS failed to reject Learned Hand's
endorsement of tax avoidance and minimal taxpayer compliance with the income
tax laws. This inaction is due in part to the victory the IRS secured in the case.34
The appropriate response by Congress or the IRS would have been to issue a
statement of agreement with the conclusion of the case, along with a statement of
disagreement over the rationale of the case. Today, the IRS issues a similar
27. Id. at 496.
28. Isham, 84 U.S. at 496.
29. Id. at 506.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 507.
32. This is consistent with Justice Brandeis' criticism of the Delaware corporate statutes as a race to the
bottom. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-60 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Moreover, Hand's statement
that "there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes" is troubling because of its potential to influence
other areas of the law. Helvering, 69 F.2d at 810.
33. Judge Learned Hand's dissenting opinion in Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir.
1947), is a classic statement in tax lore:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's
affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right,
for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced
exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.
Judge Hand's dissent has been often cited with approval. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.,
504 U.S. 505, 511 n.4 (1992); Comm'r v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394, 398 n.4 (1972); At. Coast Line
R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 173 (1947).
34. Newman, 159 F.2d at 850.
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statement known as an Action on Decision35 to indicate its acquiescence or non-
acquiescence in a particular case. The failure to act by the IRS leaves one
wondering "why?"
U.S. courts have recognized that taxpayers are free to arrange their affairs to
minimize their tax burden. The principle of minimizing tax also has roots in the
United Kingdom. 36 The freedom to arrange one's affairs traces to the principle of
freedom from governmental intrusion. This idea has deep historical roots and can
be traced to the early days of this country. In his 1791 book, The Rights of Man,
Thomas Paine writes, "What is not prohibited by the law should not be hindered;
nor should any one be compelled to that which the law does not require." 37 The
notion of minimal government intrusion in private affairs is a deeply held and
cherished principle in United States jurisprudence. However, either Congress or the
IRS should have taken the extraordinary measure of expressing disapproval with
Learned Hand's statement and reasserting the government's right to budget, assess
and collect tax revenues. Such action by either Congress or the IRS is not only
warranted, but is legally justified by virtue of the enactment of the Sixteenth
Amendment.38 Judge Learned Hand's dictum legitimizes the broader and accepted
culture of tax avoidance and nominal tax compliance-two policies which corrode
the foundations of tax policy and of an ordered society.
III. ABUSIVE TAX PRACTICES
The IRS is contending with two ostensibly distinct, but related, factions at the
same time: tax protesters and aggressive tax planners. Each one creates a unique
administrative challenge, each one is a drain on the government's limited
resources,39 and each one has increased in sophistication over time. Although they
apply to radically different taxpayer segments, they both have the common effect
of undermining the confidence, efficiency and effectiveness in the administration
of the internal revenue laws.
35. "An Action on Decision (AOD) is a formal memorandum prepared by the IRS Office of Chief Counsel
that announces the future litigation position the IRS will take with regard to the court decision addressed by the
AOD." Actions on Decisions, IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/actionsOnDecisions.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2012).
36. See, e.g., Ayrshire Pullman Motor Serv. v. The Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, (1929) 14 T.C. 754, 763
(Scot.) (Lord President Clyde) ("No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so to
arrange his legal relations to his business or to his property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest
possible shovel into his stores.").
37. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 117 (2d ed. 1791).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
39. United States v. Martin, 19 F. App'x 345, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The United States has presented
evidence that it costs an average of $4,900-in attorney salaries and other expenses incurred by the Tax Division
of the Department of Justice-to defend frivolous appeals.").
Vol. 17, No. 2
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A. The Tax Protester Movement 4°
One continuing and beleaguering challenge facing Congress is the tax protester
movement. The tax protester movement has a long and worrisome history in the
United States. Tax protesters are defined as "person[s] who oppose[ ] tax laws and
seek[ ] or employ[ ] ways, often illegal, to avoid the [tax] laws' effects .... .'4 The
thrust of the tax protesters' argument is that the IRS has no authority to tax. They
file frivolous income tax returns with the IRS, or file a frivolous tax petition with
the Tax Court. An income tax return is frivolous if it "does not contain information
on which the substantial correctness of the self-assessment may be judged, or
contains information that on its face indicates that the self-assessment is
substantially incorrect .... ,,42 "A petition to the Tax Court ... is frivolous if it is
contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for
change in the law. ''43 Tax protester arguments include recurring and settled
arguments such as the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified, 44 payment
45 46of income tax is voluntary, returns filed but filled with zeros, citizenship
exemption claims, 47 signature omissions 48 slavery, 49 war tax deductions, 0 and gold
standard exclusions.5'
Tax protesters have challenged the IRS's authority to impose a tax or a penalty
since the enactment of the Code in 1913. In 1924, Congress added a new section to
the income tax law which was designed to address the filing of frivolous appeals by
taxpayers to the Tax Board.52 This new statute was amended in 1926 and provided
that "[w]henever it appears to the [Tax] Board that proceedings before it have been
instituted by the taxpayer merely for delay, damages in an amount not in excess of
$500 shall be awarded to the United States by the Board in its decision. 5 3
40. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.9.4.8.1(2)(g) (2011) (instructing IRS personnel to "[refrain from the
use of the terms 'illegal tax protester', 'constitutionally challenged', or similar language when referring to
taxpayers. When in doubt describe the action, such as, 'the taxpayer has filed frivolous returns' or 'the taxpayer
adamantly refuses to file required returns."').
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1600 (9th ed. 2009). Illegal tax protesters denotes "[t]he name once used
by the IRS to designate a person believed to have used illegal means to avoid or reduce tax liability. In the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Congress forbade the IRS to continue using the label.
Today the term nonfiler is typically used instead." Id. (emphasis in original).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 6702(a) (2012).
43. Coleman v. Comm'r, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986).
44. United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1986).
45. United States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1986).
46. See generally United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2004).
47. United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993).
48. Selgas v. Comm'r, 475 F.3d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 2007).
49. I.R.S Service Center Advisory 200120035 (April 12, 2001).
50. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 647-48 (4th Cir. 1974). For information on peace tax advocacy,
see National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund, http://www.peacetaxfund.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (outlining
a proposal to create a non-military trust fund for conscientious objector taxpayers).
51. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-14 (identifying forty-three positions that have been deemed frivolous by courts
or have no basis for validity in existing law), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-08-14.pdf.
52. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1000, 44 Stat. 109 (1924) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6673
(2012)).
53. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 911, 44 Stat. 9 (1926) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6673 (2012)).
The Tax Court is currently authorized to assess a penalty up to $25,000. Id. § 6673(a)(1).
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Although the new statute was available to prosecute protester claims, it was seldom
invoked by the courts. 4
A second legislative effort to discourage frivolous appeals resulted
from an American Bar Association recommendation which
advocated authorizing the Board to impose costs of up to $100 on
either party if the appeal was found to be without merit ...
Congress was apparently hesitant, however, to impose costs
against the Government. As a consequence, the Board was only
authorized to penalize taxpayers "whenever it... [appeared] to the
Board that proceedings before it ... [had] been instituted by the
taxpayer merely for delay.
' 55
Regrettably, early attempts to address frivolous taxpayer claims met with
limited success. The IRS itself is partly to blame. "The [Tax] Bureau occasionally
issued groundless deficiency notices which also had the effect of increasing the
number of petitions filed. Furthermore, the Bureau was not always willing to
negotiate settlements in good faith which meant more cases had to go to trial.",56 As
a result, courts "used [their] power sparingly"57 to restrain frivolous appeals by
taxpayers.
One noteworthy tax protester case that has garnered the attention and the
admiration of the tax protester community 58 is Kellems v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.59 The taxpayer, Vivien Kellems, challenged the assessment of income tax
by the IRS as unconstitutional. Specifically, Kellems argued "that the amount of
tax paid by her in excess of that which would be payable if [the lower] joint return
rates were applied to her income is not an income tax [but rather a penalty].'60 She
also asserted that the excess amount "is not a tax which is apportioned among the
States.,61 The court summarily rejected the taxpayer's argument stating "[t]his
argument, predicated on the assertion that the 'excess' is a penalty for remaining
single, and not an income tax, is without merit.",62 The court reasoned that
"Congress was within the bounds of its constitutional role [of allocating tax
burdens between married taxpayers and individual taxpayers] since it is
conceivable Congress believed that married persons generally have greater
54. Coombs v. Comm'r, 28 B.T.A. 1216, 1217 (1933); Bateman v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 351, 370-71
(1936); Hatfield v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 895, 900 (1977) (commenting on a filing "if tax protestors continue to bring
such frivolous cases, serious consideration should be given to imposing such damages").
55. Joseph R. Cook & Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 41 ALB. L.
REV. 639, 662 (1977) (quoting Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000).
56. Id. at 660-61.
57. Wilkinson v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 633, 641 (1979).
58. See Preface to Jury Instructions from Vivian Kellem's Tax Withholding Trial, WE THE PEOPLE,
http://www.givemeliberty.orgfNoRedress/STOP/VivianKellemsTrial.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2012); see also WE
WON'T PAY!: A TAX RESISTANCE READER 419- 29 (David M. Gross ed.) (2008).
59. 58 T.C. at 556.
60. Id. at 558.
61. Id
62. Id.
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financial burdens than single persons. 63 The court concluded that "[t]he degree of
recognition given by Congress to the problem of greater financial burdens on the
part of the married taxpayers was also within the discretion of Congress since it
does not appear arbitrary or unreasonable." 64
Early tax protester cases were styled as constitutional attacks on the Code.
Another interesting case involved a constitutional challenge to Congress's power to
tax by a federal judge. In O'Malley v. Woodrough, the United States Supreme
Court considered the "question ... [i]s [the income tax law] constitutional insofar
as it include[s] in . . . 'gross income' . . . the compensation of 'judges of courts of
the United States. ,,,65 The taxpayer, Joseph W. Woodrough, "was appointed a
United States circuit judge . ,,66 He filed a joint income tax return for the
calendar year 1936 "disclos[ing] his judicial salary of $12,500, but claim[ing] to be
constitutionally immune from taxation." 67 The taxpayer argued that the income tax
as applied to him amounted to a constitutionally prohibited diminution in salary.
Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter rejected the taxpayer's claim of
unconstitutionality reasoning that "Congress has committed itself to the position
that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when applied to
the income of a federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the prohibition of
Article III, § 1, of the Constitution., 68
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the protester movement was
comparatively unsophisticated and generally involved one taxpayer. However, a
noticeable trend in tax protester activity began in the decade of the 1950's as these
cases gained both in number and sophistication. 69 Tax protesters also seized on
Learned Hand's statement and cited to it as a justification for their actions. 70 For
example, in Pfluger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the tax protester cited to
Learned Hand's statement in support of his actions.7' Additionally, organizers of
the tax protester movement cite to Learned Hand as both a source of legitimacy and
63. Id. at 559.
64. Id.
65. 307 U.S. 277, 278-79 (1939). Specifically, the Court considered whether "the provision of § 22 of the
Revenue Act of 1932 (47 Stat. 169, 178) re-enacted by Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1648,
1657)" is constitutional. Id.
66. Id. at 279.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 282. Justice Frankfurter added "To subject [judges] to a general tax is merely to recognize that
judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from
sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are
charged with administering." Id.
69. IRS RESPONSE, supra note 21, at 24. This Report stated that "Over the years, illegal tax protesters have
developed various complex and sophisticated schemes to evade or reduce their taxes, and the courts have denied
the legality of many schemes." Id.
70. WE WON'T PAY!, supra note 58, at 397; see also DAVID KING, A GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
OBJECTIVISM (1998), available at http://mol.redbam.org/objectivism/Writing/DavidKing/GuideToObjectivism/
CHAPTR14.HTM#175 (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
71. 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 503 (1986). The taxpayers argued unsuccessfully "that the Federal income tax is
unconstitutional because it acts as a societal 'leveling' device by transferring resources from the nonpoor to the
poor." Id.
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authority.72 By the 1970's and 1980's, the tax protester movement became more
sophisticated as tax protesters organized and began conducting seminars and
conferences on tax minimization and tax avoidance.73 Books, tapes, and seminars
on tax avoidance were increasingly popular with this faction. Tax protester cases
spiked and were negatively affecting the effective administration of the income tax
laws.
In 1982, Congress responded to the surge in tax protester activity by adding
frivolous return penalties to the Code.74 The new rule assessed a penalty for filing a
frivolous income tax return with the IRS. 75 The frivolous return penalty is assessed
upon a person who "files what purports to be a return . . . but which does not
contain information on which the substantial correctness of the assessment may be
judged, or contains information that on its face indicates that the self-assessment is
substantially incorrect ....
Congress originally provided that "[t]he [frivolous return] penalty would apply
only on documents purporting to be returns that are patently improper and not in
cases involving valid disputes with the Secretary, or in cases involving purely
inadvertent mathematical or clerical errors., 77 In response, taxpayers began to
request administrative conferences with IRS personnel claiming a valid dispute
existed with the objective of delaying the final resolution of the tax matter under
consideration. As a result of this taxpayer conduct, Congress amended the frivolous
return penalty in 2006 by increasing the penalty to $5,000 on any person who
submits a "specified frivolous return,"7 8 defined as "submissions . . . that are
intended to delay or impede tax administration . . . requests for a collection due. r • - ,,79
process hearing, installment agreements, and offers-in-compromise.
However, a review of the history of the tax protester movement shows that tax
protester activity has not waned over the years. Prior to 1982, the year that
TEFRA80 imposed the tax protester penalty to the Code, there were seventy-eight
reported tax protester decisions.81 After the enactment of section 6702 frivolous
return rules in 1982, there were 1,209 reported decisions, among which, about
72. Jeff Jacoby, Taxpayers Have Reason to Rebel, POST & COURIER (April 13, 1998), available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2482&dat=19980413&id=2ZhIAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ZAoNAAAAIBAJ&p
g= 1400,5385983.
73. IRS RESPONSE, supra note 21, at 3; Income Tax Protester All Out of Evasions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
1997), http://www.nytimes.comi/1997/11/16/us/income-tax-protester-all-out-of-evasions.html.
74. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 248, § 326(a), 96 Stat. 617 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6702).
75. This section is distinct from the earlier adopted section which prohibited frivolous filings with the Tax
Court.
76. 27 U.S.C. § 6702(a).
77. S. REP. No. 97-248 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1024.
78. IRS Notice 2010-33 defines a "specified submission" as "a request for a collection due process hearing
or an application for an installment agreement, offer-in-compromise, or taxpayer assistance order." I.R.S. Notice
2010-33, 2010-17 I.R.B.
79. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 407(a), 120 Stat. 2960 (codified as
amended at 26. U.S.C. § 6702 (2006)).
80. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 [hereinafter
TEFRA].
81. Data on file with author.
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1,196 decisions involving tax returns filed after the date of September 3, 1982.82
From 2006, the effective date of the most recent amendment to the frivolous return
rules through August 2011, there were thirty decisions.83 No doubt, additional
protester cases will follow.
Tax protester cases expose a colorful and imaginative facet of tax law. Tax
protester arguments range from the mundane to the inane and are frequently
84
cloaked as constitutional, substantive, or procedural arguments. One creative
taxpayer went so far as to argue that imposing the frivolous return penalty was a
"cruel and unusual punishment."85 This argument was rejected.86 Tax protesters
continue advancing well-settled arguments to challenge the authority of Congress
and of the IRS to assess, impose and collect income taxes adding strain to the tax
administration process. The financial cost of protester cases is estimated at $4,900
per case.87 Nonfinancial costs, such as the negative influence on taxpayer attitudes
and confidence in tax administration, must also be weighed. Ultimately, financial
and nonfinancial costs are "borne by all of the citizens who honestly and fairly
participate in our tax collection system."
88
The United States system of self-assessment produces an environment where
taxpayers have the opportunity to engage in self-help to adjust their tax liability
whenever they perceive the tax system to be unfair. With an audit percentage of
less than two percent, some taxpayers may not be able to resist the urge to
favorably adjust their tax liability. 89 Not surprisingly, tax protesters have seized
upon the self-assessment characterization of the U.S. tax system to justify their act
of non-compliance with the tax law.
90
Arguments advanced by tax protesters are, by now, all too familiar and
demonstrably unfounded. Admittedly, the dollars of tax protester cases may not
reach into the billions of the tax shelter cases. Nonetheless what the frivolous
return faction lacks in financial depth, it makes up in breadth because of its virulent
ability to reach a vast number of taxpayers through its network of websites, books,
and seminars.
In 2006, the IRS began publishing taxpayer positions that have been identified
by the IRS as frivolous taxpayer arguments. IRS Notice 2010-339' contains forty
frivolous arguments. The law involving tax protester challenges is categorically
settled. Still, tax protesters continue unabated, straining valuable administrative and
judicial resources. Judge Kanne's expression regarding tax protesters is both an
instructive and illuminating insight into the psychology of a tax protester. He notes,
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Tax-Freedom.com, Perfect Tax Avoidance, http://www.tax-freedom.com (last visited June 26, 2012).
85. Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 248, 253 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
86. Id.; see also Bearden v. Comm'r, 575 F. Supp. 1459, 1462 (D. Utah 1983) (rejecting a similar
argument).
87. See WE WON'T PAY!, supra note 58.
88. Hunt v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 31 (1990).
89. The overall audit rate for 2010 was just 1.1%. I.R.S., ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS FOR FY
2010, at 2, available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=232430,00.html.
90. Tedder, 787 F.2d at 542.
91. I.R.S. Notice 2010-33, I.R.B. 2010-17.
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"[l]ike moths to a flame, some people find themselves irresistibly drawn to the tax
protestor movement's illusory claim that there is no legal requirement to pay
federal income tax."
92
B. Aggressive Tax Planning, the Presumption of Permissiveness and the
Problem of the Unprescribed Tax Benefit
The other challenge facing Congress concerns aggressive tax planning. These
transactions manifest themselves primarily as tax shelters, but are not necessarily
limited to tax shelter activity. 93 For purposes of this article, "aggressive tax
planning" means using any entity, device, or arrangement that lacks a material non-
tax benefit in combination with any domestic or foreign law to significantly reduce
the income tax liability of the taxpayer in the absence of authority 94 for such tax
position. Aggressive tax planning transactions exploit the Code by injecting a
presumption of permissiveness into the subject transaction.
Tax law is based both on prescribed provisions and to a degree, on a
presumption of permissiveness. Prescribed tax benefits are characterized by
Congressional debate and approval, statutory enactment, and budgetary
appropriation. hn contrast, unprescribed tax benefits fail to satisfy these three
fundamental requirements. Congress expresses assent to intended tax benefits when
there is debate, enactment, and acknowledgement of "the cost to the public
treasury., 95 In this regard, some transactions reflect express congressional policy.
Other transactions, however, are nothing more than a contortion of agreements,
hollow entities, and pointless undertakings designed to give the appearance of
substance to an otherwise insubstantial arrangement.
When Congress intends to bestow tax benefits, it clearly and expressly
indicates its willingness to benefit taxpayers whom it wants to permit access to
prescribed tax benefits. 96 The corporate reorganization provisions, tax-exempt
rules, or capital gain requirements all reflect congressional intent. In this manner,
Congress enacts legislation making it desirable for taxpayers to engage in tax
reducing activities.
97
92. United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 499 (7th Cir. 1991).
93. It also bears noting that not all tax shelter activity is necessarily abusive.
94. Examples of transactions where authority has been indicated include statutorily intended transactions
(section 338, 351, 368, etc.) which satisfy the underlying objective of the statute, transactions to which the IRS has
acquiesced, and transactions substantially similar to examples indicated in the income tax regulations or a revenue
ruling.
95. For example, "The tax-free treatment of employer-paid health insurance will cost the government $160
billion this year, according to the Treasury Department. The tax break for mortgage interest will cost $92 billion.
And deductions for state and local taxes will take $34 billion from federal coffers." Edmund L. Andrews & Lori
Montgomery, Tax breaks and loopholes that cost us $1 trillion a year have staunch defenders, WASH. POST., May
2, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/01/AR2010050100243.html.
96. A tax expenditure is defined in 2 U.S.C.A. § 622(3) as "those revenue losses attributable to provisions
of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability; and the term "tax expenditures
budget" means an enumeration of such tax expenditures.
97. No area of the Code has been left untouched, whether individual, partnership, corporate, international,
or procedural matters.
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Congress also recognizes that it cannot regulate every single variant of taxation
conceived in the mind of taxpayers or their advisors. As a result and in the interest
of administrative efficiency, Congress enacts general rules governing the treatment
of certain items. The general rules governing routine business deductions, 98
miscellaneous deductions,99 and charitable contributions 00 serve as illustrative
examples. These general rules are designed to provide taxpayers with a framework
and the statutory authority to justify reasonable tax positions implemented by
taxpayers.
However, there is arguably another area in tax law where savvy taxpayers
access tax benefits, albeit without the express consent of Congress-the
unprescribed benefit. It is here where Congress must act. The benefits provided by
this area are frequently vague, uncertain and ambitious. Taxpayers have seized
upon ambiguities in the Code, and a presumption of permissiveness, to implement
tax strategies that maximize their returns at public expense. Taxpayers accomplish
this result by accessing the imprecision of the income tax law and by structuring
transactions that are ambitious and elaborate, with authority that is ambiguous and
doubtful. 101 The unprescribed tax benefit is derived not from any authority or
precedent, but from uncertainty, ambiguity, and opportunity. It has produced tax
shelters, many of which have been described as abusive. 02
The S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2) is an illustrative
example. The strategy of a SC2 involves making a donation of S-corporation stock
by the donor S-corporate shareholder, to a donee tax-exempt entity pursuant to the
terms of a redemption agreement. 103 The "SC2 is directed [toward] individuals who
own profitable corporations organized under [Sub]Chapter S of the [Code]."10 4
Under Subchapter S rules, "the corporation's income is attributed directly to the
corporate owners and taxable as personal income"10 5 in the year the income is
earned regardless of whether the income is distributed. The objective of the SC2 is
to allocate paper profits to the tax exempt entity for the period it held the S-
corporation stock. These profits, however, are never distributed to the tax-exempt
shareholder. 0 6 Instead, the profits are eventually distributed to the original
98. Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") provides in relevant part that a taxpayer may
deduct "ordinary and necessary" expenses. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006).
99. Section 212 of the Code provides in relevant part that a taxpayer may deduct "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses.., for the production or collection of income .... 26 U.S.C. § 212 (2006).
100. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006).
101. See Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 731, (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("this
case is of doubtful authority in view of Speiser v. Randall, which was decided four years later").
102. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 89-74, 1989-1 C.B. 311 (discussing taxpayer attempts to channel their income
through "churches" the taxpayers themselves have set up to avoid taxes). A change in lexicon of the dialogue from
"tax shelter" to "unprescribed tax benefit" may sharpen the debate. "Shelter" carries both positive and negative
connotations and distracts meaningful analysis from the core issue, whether the tax benefit has been prescribed by
Congress.
103. Christopher R. Hoyt, Charitable Gifts by S Corporations and their Shareholders: Two Worlds of Law
Collide, 36 ACTEC L.J. 693 (2011).
104. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOv'T AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMS IN THE U.S.
TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, S. REP. NO. 109-54, at 10 (2005) [hereinafter U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY].
105. Id.
106. "[The] SC2 was intended to generate a tax deductible charitable donation for the corporate owner and,
more importantly, to defer and reduce taxation of a substantial portion of the income produced by the S
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donating shareholder after it exercises its rights to reclaim the S-corporation stock
in accordance with the terms of a redemption agreement. 10 7 The donee organization
realizes its income only when the original donating shareholders redeem the S
corporation stock from the tax-exempt organization at a prescribed price.10 8 The
duration of the transaction generally lasted between two to three years.
09
The financial rewards to tax exempt organizations participating in S2C
transactions were irresistible. The Los Angeles Department of Fire and Police
Pensions reported receiving "payments totaling $5.9 million dollars"'110 for
participating in the transaction. The Austin Fire Fighters Relief and Retirement
Fund did not disclose the amount of money it received. However,
the fund administrator [for this organization] characterized the S[-]
Corporation stock as "basically useless" and stated that he believed
the fund would only receive income from the stock when the
original owner repurchased it. He [also] indicated . . . that the
sentiment at the pension fund was not to "look a gift horse in the
mouth."''11
These unprescribed benefits enable aggressive tax planning transactions and
investment strategies that are exploited by taxpayers, consultants, and their
advisors. The Senate Report on the Tax Shelter Industry details the enthusiasm for
that exploitation:
[A]fter SC2 was launched, the head of KPMG's Federal Practice
sent the following email to the SC2 "area champions" around the
country [stating]: I want to personally thank everyone for their
efforts during the approval process of this strategy. It was
completed very quickly and everyone demonstrated true
teamwork. Thank you! Now let[']s SELL, SELL, SELL!!
112
Unprescribed benefits cost the U.S. treasury billions of dollars every year in
lost tax revenue. 13 This cost is ultimately transferred to, and borne by, the public at
large.114 Additionally, one study concludes that aggressive tax planning also results
Corporation, essentially by 'allocating' but not actually distributing that income to a tax exempt charity holding
the corporation's stock." Id.
107. Id. at 28-29.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 29.
110. Id. at 127.
Ill. U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note 104, at 132.
112. Id. at35.
113. Id. at 11 ("Accounting firms were devoting substantial resources to develop, market, and implement tax
shelters, costing the Treasury billions of dollars in lost tax revenues.").
114. United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY
COMPLIANCE 10 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax gapreport final 080207 linked.pdf
("The IRS estimates that tax fraud on individual income tax returns generates revenue losses of about $197 billion
a year (not counting $25 billion in losses from nonfiling).").
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in a decrease in financial transparency." 5 The effects of aggressive tax planning are
not limited solely to the field of tax, but have demonstrated effects in other areas of
the law.
Unprescribed tax benefits also impose an administrative and an enforcement
burden on an already strained IRS workforce, and have given rise to a tax shelter
industry. "Tax shelters have been a growth industry for financial intermediaries;
these intermediaries have dramatically expanded shelter opportunities for corporate
taxpayers; and while corporate tax revenues have risen with the booming economy,
shelters have removed billions from government coffers."" 
6
It is reasonable to expect that taxpayers will evaluate structures that maximize
their return and minimize their transactional costs, including the tax cost of the
transaction. Investment potential is frequently analyzed from a spectrum of
opportunities that includes operational, financial, legal, accounting, and tax
perspectives. Opportunities and risks are researched, decisions are made, and plans
are implemented. This behavior is common to all, regardless of size, industry, or
economic status. However, taxpayers engaging in aggressive planning transactions
undertake activities of dubious substance and structure, with the intent of
substantially reducing their tax liability-all under the guise of a permissive, albeit
unprescribed, tax benefit.
Unfortunately, the cruel reality is that "[t]he more complex the tax system is,
the harder it is to fathom its outcomes. There is substantial-and well-founded-
public suspicion that well-heeled... taxpayers can use a complex system to their
advantage, while other taxpayers cannot. Such a suspicion can seriously erode
voluntary compliance, which is the bedrock of our system."'" 7 The policy
objectives of simplicity and fairness are eroded whenever taxpayers access
unprescribed tax benefits.
IV. THE LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL TAX DOCTRINES IN CURBING
AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING
Courts have developed a number of judicial tax doctrines that operate as gap
fillers to the Code. These doctrines provide taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts with
a measure of guidance." 8 There exists a belief that "[n]o matter how perceptive the
legislature, it cannot anticipate all events and circumstances that may unfold, and
due to linguistic limitations, statutes do not always capture the essence of what is
115. See generally Karthik Balakrishnan, Jennifer L. Blouin & Wayne R. Guay, Does Tax Aggressiveness
Reduce Financial Reporting Transparency?, (Mar. 20, 2011) (unpublished study), available at SSRN:
http://ssm.com/abstract- 1792783.
116. Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 19 (2000).
117. William A. Drennan, The Patent Office Is Promoting Shocking New Tax Loopholes-Should the
Empire Strike Back?, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 491, 518 (2007).
118. These tax doctrines are commonly known as the business purpose doctrine, the economic substance
doctrine, the step transaction doctrine, the substance over form doctrine, the sham transaction doctrine, and the
sham entity doctrine, discussed infra.
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intended."1 19 Courts, the IRS, and taxpayers have invoked these doctrines to
challenge or to justify aggressive planning transactions.
These common law tax doctrines, however, have limitations. At times they
overlap and create confusion. It is not unusual to discover that "[tihe terminology
of one rule may appear in the context of the other because they share the same
rationale. 1 20 As with any common law doctrine, conflicts among the circuits can
arise and may require a Supreme Court resolution or an act of Congress to resolve
the conflict.' 21 Additionally, unlike income tax statutes that mandate a particular
method of analysis, the very same judicial doctrine may articulate differing tests.
Some courts have observed "[tests] give the comforting illusion of consistency and
precision. [These tests] often obscure rather than clarify.' 22 Although these
doctrines each purport to address a deficiency in the Code, "[a] study by the Joint
Committee on Taxation concludes that 'these doctrines are not entirely
distinguishable' and have been applied by courts in inconsistent ways.' 23
Applying these common law doctrines often adds another layer of complexity of
analysis to an already challenging situation, leaving taxpayers and the IRS to
engage in a "semantic ju jitsu' ' 124 as each litigant seeks to gain advantage over the
other.
A. The Business Purpose Doctrine
Helvering v. Gregory125 is recognized as the fountainhead for common law
doctrines. It is credited with originating the "business purpose" doctrine. It has also
been credited with originating several other tax doctrines including the substance
over form and the economic substance doctrine.
In Gregory v. Helvering, the taxpayer engaged in a tax-free reorganization
transaction admittedly "[flor the sole purpose of procuring a transfer of... shares
to herself in order to sell them for her individual profit, and, at the same time,
diminish the amount of income tax which would result for a direct transfer by way
of dividend .... ,,26 By engaging in this transaction, the taxpayer sought to convert
a dividend payment into a tax-free corporate reorganization. In defense of her
actions, the taxpayer argued that "every element required by the [taxing statute]
was done, a statutory reorganization was effected; and that the motive of the
119. Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies, 42 B.C. L. REv. 587,
588-89 (2001).
120. ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Zmuda v. Comm'r,
731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984)).
121. For example, the economic substance doctrine was codified by Congress and resolved the circuit
conflict regarding whether the test was conjunctive or disjunctive. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-68 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §
7701(o)).
122. Rose v. Comm'r, 868 F.2d 851, 854, (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Collins v. Comm'r, 857 F.2d 1383, 1386
(9th Cir. 1988)).
123. U.S. TAx SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note 104, at 4.
124. ASA Investerings P'ship, 201 F.3d at 511.
125. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, Helvering v. Gregory, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
126. 293 U.S. at 467.
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taxpayer thereby to escape payment of a tax will not alter the result or make
unlawful what the statute allows.' 27
The Supreme Court rejected the taxpayer's argument of literal compliance with
the Code and affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 28 Justice
Sutherland, writing for the majority of the Court, noted:
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes, or all together avoid them, by means
which the law permits, cannot be doubted. But the question for
determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax
motive, was the thing which the statute intended.
1 29
The Court added that "an operation having no business or corporate purpose
... was nothing more than a contrivance."' 30 The Court reasoned that a transaction
which has no business purpose other than the mere technical compliance with the
tax statutes, serves no business purpose, and can be disregarded by the IRS. '31
The application of the business purpose doctrine generates considerable
uncertainty for regulators and the courts. Courts grapple with fundamental
questions such as "What constitutes a valid business purpose?" and "How much of
a business purpose is required?" Not surprisingly, courts across the federal circuits
have reached mixed results on these questions. Compaq Computer Corp. &
Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue illustrates the challenges faced
by courts as they grapple with applying the business purpose doctrine. 
1 32
The taxpayer, Compaq, entered into a foreign transaction involving the
purchase and immediate resale of American Depository Receipt ("ADR")
certificates. 33 The transactions were arranged so that the purchase and the sale of
the ADR's straddled the dividend date.' 34 Compaq acquired the ADR with dividend
rights and immediately sold the ADR's without dividend rights. 35 The difference
between the two selling prices generated a $20.7 million dollar capital loss for
Compaq which it intended to use to shelter part of a $231.7 million dollar capital
gain.' 36 An economic analysis of the transactions reveal that the purchase
transaction of the ADR's included the price of the dividend that was declared and
paid, while the subsequent sale transaction excluded it. The IRS challenged the
transaction arguing that the taxpayer's transactions lacked economic substance and
a business purpose.
127. Id. at 468-69.
128. Id. at 470.
129. Id. at 469.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 277 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Compaq 11].
133. Id. at 779. (The court explained "la]n ADR is a trading unit, issued by a trust, that represents ownership
of stock in a foreign corporation.").
134. Id.
135. Id. at 780.
136. Id.
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The Tax Court in Compaq I cited to the United States Supreme Court, and
announced that "a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance ...
compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities ... imbued with tax-
independent considerations, and .. .not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features
'should be respected for tax purposes. ' 137 The Tax Court reasoned that "[t]o satisfy
the business purpose requirement of the economic substance inquiry, 'the
transaction must be rationally related to a useful nontax purpose that is plausible in
light of the taxpayer's conduct and ... economic situation . ,,,138 The Tax Court
noted that the "inquiry [into the business purpose] takes into account whether the
taxpayer conducts itself in a realistic and legitimate business fashion, thoroughly
considering and analyzing the ramifications of a questionable transaction, before
proceeding with the transaction."'
' 39
The Tax Court noted that:
The freedom to arrange one's affairs to minimize taxes does not
include the right to engage in financial fantasies with the
expectation that the Internal Revenue Service and the courts will
play along. The Commissioner and the courts are empowered, and
in fact duty-bound, to look beyond the contrived forms of
transactions to their economic substance and to apply the tax laws
accordingly.
140
The Tax Court held in favor of the government, concluding that the
transactions at issue lacked economic substance and a valid business purpose.141
Dissatisfied with the outcome, Compaq appealed the decision of the Tax Court to
the Court of Appeals.
142
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court. 43 It found
that "as to [a] business purpose: even assuming that Compaq sought primarily to
get otherwise unavailable tax benefits in order to offset unrelated tax liabilities and
unrelated capital gains, this need not invalidate the transaction."' 44 The Court of
Appeals cited with approval, the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]he fact that
favorable tax consequences were taken into account by [the taxpayer] on entering
into the transaction is no reason for disallowing those consequences. We cannot
ignore the reality that the tax laws affect the shape of nearly every business
transaction."
' 145
137. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 220 (1999) (quoting Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978)) [hereinafter Compaq I].
138. Id. at 224 (quoting ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1993), aff'd in part, rev d in part,
157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.1998)).
139. Id. at 224.
140. Id. at 221 (quoting Saviano v. Comm'r, 765 F.2d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 1985)).
141. Id. at 219-20.
142. Compaq 11, 277 F.3d at 788.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 786.
145. Id. (quoting Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 580).
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The Court of Appeals also flatly rejected the Tax Court's rationale that an
absence of risk in a transaction precluded the finding of a business purpose. 46 The
Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he absence of risk that can legitimately be
eliminated does not make a transaction a sham.', 147 Managing, allocating and
minimizing transactional risk are acceptable methods of satisfying the business
purpose standard. The Court of Appeals concluded "that the transaction had a
sufficient business purpose independent of tax considerations.'
148
Interestingly, both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals cited approvingly to
the same Supreme Court case of Frank Lyon Co. to justify their decision. However,
they arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions. The Tax Court found for the
IRS 14 9 and the Court of Appeals found for the taxpayer. 150 The uncertainty
surrounding the application of the business purpose doctrine is inescapable since
the "[b]usiness purpose [doctrine] necessarily involves subjectivity because no two
applications can be the same; no taxpayer can be in precisely the same position as
another taxpayer."' 51
The uncertainty concerning the business purpose rule is apparent. The IRS has
successfully invoked the business purpose doctrine to invalidate a transaction that
was entered into by the taxpayer for tax-avoidance purposes. For example, in ACM
Partnership, the doctrine was successfully invoked to challenge a complex
partnership transaction formed to generate capital losses. 152 In Rice's Toyota
World, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 153 the doctrine was also
successfully invoked to challenge a sale-leaseback transaction which was designed
solely for the purposes of generating depreciation deductions. In Kirchman v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the business purpose doctrine was again
successfully invoked to challenge option straddle transactions which were executed
to generate tax deductions, but which had no real risk of loss attached to the
transaction. 
54
In contrast, taxpayers have successfully invoked the business purpose doctrine
to validate a transaction notwithstanding the presence of tax motive reasons. In
ASA Investerings Partnership, the court stated "[i]t is uniformly recognized that
taxpayers are entitled to structure their transactions in such a way as to minimize
tax."'155 In Jacobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court found a
business purpose.present in the face of a losing investment on the basis that such a
loss was not predictable before the taxpayer engaged in the transaction. 156
146. Id at 787.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 783 n.3. It bears noting that "[t]he Tax Court's decision in this case has been subject to extensive
commentary, friendly and not so friendly."
150. Id. at 788.
151. Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic Substance and the Standard of Review, 60 ALA. L. REV.
339, 373 (2009).
152. ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 247-48.
153. 752 F.2d 89, 90-92 (4th Cir. 1985).
154. 862 F.2d 1486, 1488-89 (11 th Cir. 1989).
155. ASA Investerings P'ship, 201 F.3d at 513.
156. 915 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1990).
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"When the business purpose doctrine is violated, such structuring is deemed to
have gotten out of hand, to have been carried to such extreme lengths that the
business purpose is no more than a facade. But there is no absolutely clear line
.... The business purpose doctrine has no seemingly objective standards and
is imbued with discretion and judgment in its application. Courts disagree on the
relative importance of the business purpose doctrine. One court states that "[t]he
business purpose doctrine reduces the incentive to engage in .. .essentially
wasteful activity, and .. .helps achieve reasonable equity among taxpayers who
are similarly situated-in every respect except for differing investments in tax
avoidance.,158 However, this same court notes quite emphatically that "... the
'business purpose' doctrine is hazardous."159
B. The Economic Substance Doctrine
The economic substance doctrine represents a judicial effort to
enforce the statutory purpose of the tax code. From its inception,
the economic substance doctrine has been used to prevent
taxpayers from subverting the legislative purpose of the tax code
by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or lack economic
reality simply to reap a tax benefit.'
60
Courts applying the economic substance doctrine note that "the economic
substance doctrine is merely a judicial tool for effectuating the underlying
Congressional purpose that, despite literal compliance with the statute, tax benefits
,,161[should] not be afforded based on transactions lacking in economic substance.
The economic substance doctrine has been used extensively by the IRS in
combating abusive transactions. "From 1995 through October 2006, the United
States utilized the economic substance doctrine to challenge taxpayers in 170
decided court cases involving over $4.4 billion in taxable income.'
162
Conceptually, the economic substance doctrine appears simple and
straightforward. The doctrine, however, has proven elusive and problematic and
has given rise to interpretational difficulties. Courts applying the economic
substance test use a two prong test when analyzing the economic substance of a
transaction. The objective prong requires examining the economic substance of the
transaction and the subjective prong requires determining the taxpayer's subjective
intent when entering into the transaction.' 
63
Until recently, the circuits were split concerning how to evaluate and apply the
economic substance doctrine. The question was whether the test was to be applied
157. ASA Investerings P'ship, 201 F.3d at 513.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
161. Id. at 1354.
162. Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 151, at 342 n.8.
163. Rice's Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91-92.
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in a conjunctive manner or in a disjunctive manner. The Seventh Circuit,1 64 Eighth
Circuit, 165 and Eleventh Circuit' 66 applied the test in a conjunctive manner. In
contrast, the Second Circuit, 167 Fourth Circuit,' 68 and the D.C. Circuit' 69 applied the
test in a disjunctive manner. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 170 took a
different approach altogether. The remaining circuits considered the two prong test
as elements in their analysis of the economic substance of the transaction.'
7 1
Congress codified the economic substance doctrine in 2010.172 This
codification resolved the circuit split. The codified economic substance rule
mandates a two prong test when analyzing the economic substance of a transaction.
The two prong test provides that:
In the case of any transaction to which the economic substance
doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having
economic substance only if (A) the transaction changes in a
meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the
taxpayer's economic position, and (B) the taxpayer has a
substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for
entering into such transaction.
73
Moreover, the codified economic substance doctrine provides that the profit
potential of a transaction is "met . . . only if the present value of the reasonably
expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present
value of the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were
respected.,
174
The codification of the economic substance doctrine is a marked improvement
over its common law form because it clarifies Congress's preference for a
conjunctive test. It also establishes a uniform standard of analysis to be used when
evaluating the economic factors. The codification of the economic substance
doctrine also answers critics, such as Judge McKee, whose forceful dissent in ACM
Partnership argued that a majority of the court "injected the 'economic substance'
analysis into an inquiry where it does not belong."'' 75 Courts now have a
congressionally mandated rule which removes the cloud of doubt over its
application by courts. However, future courts will continue to grapple with
164. Yosha v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1988).
165. IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 2001).
166. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
167. DeMartino v. Conm'r, 862 F.2d 400,406 (2d Cir. 1988).
168. Rice's Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91-92.
169. Horn v. Comm'r, 968 F.2d 1229, 1237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
170. Coltec Indus., 454 F.3d at 1340.
171. See ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 247-48; Merryman v. Comm'r, 873 F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir. 1989); Rose,
868 F.2d at 853-54; Casebeer v. Comm'r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1990); Dewees v. Comm'r, 870 F.2d.
21 (1st Cit. 1989).
172. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of'2010, supra note 121, at 1067-68.
173. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(1).
174. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).
175. ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 263 (McKee, J., dissenting).
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identifying and defining abstract concepts contained within the codified statute,
such as when does a "transaction change in a meaningful way ... the taxpayer's
economic position,"'' 76 and when does "the taxpayer [have] a substantial [non-tax]
purpose?"' 177 These essential questions remain unanswered and will continue to be
a source of dispute in future litigation, thus rendering its effectiveness in the battle
against abusive transactions questionable.
C. The Substance-over-Form Doctrine
The substance-over-form doctrine is another judicially created doctrine used by
the courts and the IRS when evaluating potentially abusive transactions. "The
concept of the substance-over-form doctrine is that the tax results of an
arrangement are better determined based on the underlying substance rather than an
evaluation of the mere formal steps by which the arrangement was undertaken."
1 78
It is used by courts and the IRS to disregard the formalities of a transaction and to
look through the form into the substance of the transaction. It has been used by the
IRS with mixed results in abusive transactions.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co. 179 is the landmark
case giving rise to the substance over form doctrine. In Court Holding II, the
taxpayer negotiated for the sale of its sole asset to a buyer.' 80 After negotiating and
reaching an oral agreement, the taxpayer accepted a $1,000 payment from the
buyer.' 81 When the parties "met to reduce the agreement to writing," the taxpayer
company learned from its lawyer "that the sale . . would result in the imposition
of a large income tax . . ,,82 The transaction was subsequently restructured from a
direct sale by the corporate taxpayer, into a two-step transaction. 83 The first step
involved a complete liquidation of the corporate assets in exchange for a surrender
of the common shares held by the shareholders.' 84 The second involved a direct
sale of the property by the shareholders in their individual capacity to the buyer.' 
85
The IRS argued that the sale transaction should be recast as a sale from the
corporation to the buyer and that the intermediary forms, namely the complete
liquidation by the corporation and subsequent sale by the shareholders, should be
disregarded.' 86 The corporate taxpayer argued "that the sale was made by its
176. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A).
177. Id. § 7701(o)(1)(B).
178. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200915033, 2009 WL 965870, at *10.
179. 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) [hereinafter Court Holding 11].
180. Id. at 332.
181. Id. at 333. There was a difference between how the [accounting] books and the 1940 income tax return
of the corporation reported "rent". The [accounting] books reflected rental income of $1,000, while the income tax
return reflected $2,125. "The $1,000 shown on the [accounting] books as income from rent in 1940 was
determined to have been a payment on the purchase price." Court Holding Co. v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 531, 535 (1943)
[hereinafter Court Holding fl. "Through inadvertence, the 1940 return was not verified by the officers who
executed it." Id. at 538-39.
182. Court Holding I1, 324 U.S. at 333.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Court Holding 1, 2 T.C. at 537.
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stockholders individually after the property had been distributed to them in
complete liquidation, and that therefore the [corporate taxpayer] realized no taxable
gain on the sale."'
' 87
The Supreme Court held for the government and rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the form of the transaction should control. 88 The Court held that
"[t]he incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction. The tax
consequences which arise from gains from a sale of property are not finally to be
determined solely by the means employed to transfer legal title."' 89 The Supreme
Court disapproved of the taxpayer's mid-stream change in transactional form in
order to minimize the income tax liability. The court reasoned "[t]o permit the true
nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to
alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax
policies of Congress.'
190
Courts recognize that taxpayers have the freedom to structure their transactions
in a manner which fulfills the taxpayer's objectives. For instance, in Higgins v.
Smith, the Supreme Court stated "[a] taxpayer is free to adopt such organization for
his affairs as he may choose and having elected to do some business as a
corporation, he must accept the tax disadvantages."' 9' However, the Supreme Court
also recognized there are limits to a taxpayer's choice involving tax matters. The
Supreme Court remarked:
[T]he Government may not be required to acquiesce in the
taxpayer's election of that form for doing business which is most
advantageous to him. The Government may look at actualities and
upon determination that the form employed for doing business or
carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham may
sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the
purposes of the tax statute. To hold otherwise would permit the
schemes of taxpayers to supersede legislation in the determination
of the time and manner oftaxation. 92
Notwithstanding the taxpayer's right to choose a form which best suits his
interests and the IRS's right to review a taxpayer's choice, the contours of this
doctrine continue to be elusive and undefined. This continuing uncertainty strikes
at the core of the tax policy objectives of simplicity and efficiency.
187. Id. The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that the sale was unenforceable by virtue of the
statute of frauds which requires a writing to enforce a contract involving the sale of land. The Tax Court disposed
of this argument stating "as we have said, the [oral] contract which was executed and the sale which was
consummated were in substance the petitioner's contract and sale. Thus any question as to the effect of the statute
of frauds is avoided, since the oral agreement was fully executed and performed." Id. at 539.
188. Court Holding I, 324 U.S. at 334.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 308 U.S. 473,477 (1940).
192. Id. at 477-78.
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D. The Step Transaction Doctrine
The step transaction doctrine is another common law doctrine frequently used
to evaluate the substance and independent significance of each step to a
transaction. It is used by courts to evaluate multiple steps of a transaction and,
when necessary, to consolidate the different steps into a single transaction for
income tax purposes.193 When applied, the doctrine disregards the intermediary
steps of a transaction and looks to the final step of the transaction. Of all the
common law doctrines, the step transaction doctrine has yielded the greatest result
for the IRS.
The Tax Court has recognized that "[t]he step transaction doctrine is in effect
another rule of substance over form.194 It treats a series of formally separate 'steps'
as a single transaction if such steps are in substance integrated, interdependent, and
focused toward a particular result."' 95 As noted by the Tax Court in Penrod,
"[t]here is no universally accepted test as to when and how the step transaction
doctrine should be applied to a given set of facts. Courts have applied three
alternative tests in deciding whether to invoke the step transaction doctrine in a
particular situation."' 96 The three generally accepted approaches to the step
transaction doctrine are the binding commitment test, the interdependence test, and
the end-results test.
197
The first approach is the binding commitment test, and is the narrowest of the
three approaches. Under the binding commitment test "a series of transactions are
collapsed if, at the time the first step is entered into, there was a binding
commitment to undertake the later step.' 98 The binding commitment test has the
advantage of promoting certainty in... tax planning .... "1 99 Under this test, "a
court must make an objective determination" concerning the parties respective
obligations.20 0 A party's intent is disregarded under this test.
20
'
The second approach, the interdependence test, "focuses on whether 'the steps
are so interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would have
been fruitless without a completion of the series."''20 2 This test requires a court to
determine "whether the individual steps had independent significance or whether
193. True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999).
194. Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1429.
197. Id. at 1429-30.
198. Id. at 1429. See Comm'r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968); see also United States v. Adkins-Phelps,
Inc., 400 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1968); Ward v. Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 1251 (1934).
199. Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1429.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1430 (quoting Redding v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980); see also King Enter.,
Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. CI. 1969) (quoting the same language); Helvering v. Alabama
Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1942) (explaining that intermediate transactional steps are to be
ignored where they contribute "nothing of substance to the completed affair"); South Bay Corp. v. Comm'r, 345
F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1965) (noting the importance of analyzing the transaction as a whole).
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they had meaning only as part of the larger transaction .... Predictably, the
evaluation of the individual steps has led to inconsistent results.
The third, and broadest approach, is the end result test:
Under this test, the step transaction doctrine will be invoked if it
appears that a series of formally separate steps are really pre-
arranged parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to
reach the ultimate result. The end result test is based upon the
actual intent of the parties as of the time of the [transaction]. 2°
When evaluating the intent of the parties, a court "must necessarily rely rather
heavily on objective facts under the theory that one's actions generally reflect one's
intentions., 20 5 The end result test is contextual and looks beyond the formalities of
the underlying transaction to determine whether the doctrine is to be applied. "The
Internal Revenue Service has indicated on several occasions that threshold steps
will not be disregarded under a step transaction analysis if such preliminary activity
results in a permanent alteration of a previous bona fide business relationship.
'
"
2 6
The following cases illustrate how the step transaction doctrine is applied to
disregard the intermediary steps undertaken by the taxpayer.
In H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, the court applied the step transaction
doctrine to invalidate a series of complicated transfers intended to generate a $42.5
million dollar refund.20 7 "At issue is whether the H.J Heinz Credit Company
(HCC), a subsidiary of the H.J. Heinz Company (Heinz) may deduct a capital loss
of $124,134,189 on a sale of 175,000 shares of Heinz stock. 208
Heinz created a wholly owned subsidiary, H.J. Heinz Credit Company (HCC),
in 1983.209 In 1994, HCC purchased 3.5 million shares of Heinz Stock. 2 10 In May
1995, HCC then transferred ninety-five percent of the stock it acquired to Heinz in
exchange for a convertible note.211 Heinz argued that the exchange "was a
redemption [transaction] which should be taxed as a dividend, and that HCC's
basis in the redeemed stock should be added to its basis in the 175,000 shares it
retained. '21 2 The IRS countered, arguing that "no redemption [transaction]
occurred because Heinz had no business purpose for interposing a subsidiary
between itself and the shareholders.., save to engineer an artificial tax loss.
'213
Sustaining the disallowance by the IRS, Judge Allegra, writing for the United
States Court of Federal Claims, cogently declared:
203. Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1430.
204. Id. at 1429-30 (citations omitted).
205. McDonald's of Zion, 432, Ill., Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 972, 989 n.26 (1981), rev'd, 688 F.2d 520 (7th
Cir. 1982).
206. Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156.
207. 76 Fed. CI. 570, 590-91 (2007).
208. Id. at 572.
209. Id. at 573.
210. Id. at 577.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 572.
213. Id.
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This court will not don blinders to the realities of the transaction
before it. Stripped of its veneer, the acquisition by HCC of the
Heinz stock had one purpose, and one purpose alone-producing
capital losses that could be carried back to wipe out prior capital
gains. There was no other genuine business purpose. As such,
under the prevailing standard, the transaction in question must be
viewed as a sham-a transaction imbued with no significant tax-
independent considerations, but rather characterized, at least in
terms of HCC's participation, solely by tax avoidance features.
214
In a direct reference to an earlier Heinz ketchup slogan, "It's Red Magic
Time," Judge Allegra rebuked Heinz and declared that "no amount of magic, red or
otherwise, can hide the meat of the transactions in questions .... ,,25
In another case, Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States ("LTCH"), the
court again applied the step transaction to disregard a series of transactions
designed to generate $106 million in tax benefits. 21 6 In LTCH, the taxpayer's
challenged the "IRS denial of $106,058,228 in capital losses . ,,2 17 The court
rejected the taxpayer's (long term) argument that the step transaction should be
precluded because its transactions purportedly "had economic substance . .
operated for valid and substantial business purposes to make a material pre-tax
profit, and expected to continue in the same manner for the foreseeable future...
,,218 The court reasoned that "the presence of a valid business purpose and
independent economic substance in the entity used as a transactional vehicle or
some valid business purpose for the transaction itself does not bar application of
the step transaction doctrine, rather both are circumstances to be considered in a
multi-factor analysis. 2 19 The court further noted that it "[saw] no reason why using
an ongoing business entity. . . which otherwise engaged in independent profit
making activities, as the vehicle to accomplish the parties' ultimate objective
should shield a transaction from step transaction analysis, particularly where the
purpose of the transaction was to buy tax losses . .,220 LTCH yields an interesting
result because the court was willing to extend the application of the step transaction
doctrine notwithstanding the presence of "independent profit making activities" in
one of the steps to the transaction.221
Historically, the step transaction doctrine has been used to disregard
transactions where the intermediate steps themselves lacked substance. However,
these cases suggest a noticeable trend that the step transaction doctrine may be
successfully invoked by the IRS despite the presence of economic substance within
214. H.i. Heinz Co., 76 Fed. Cl. at 587.
215. 1d. at 593.
216. 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127 (D. Conn. 2004), aft'd, 150 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2005).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 192.
219. Id. at 193 (adopting the reasoning of the 10th Circuit) (citing Associated Wholesale Grocers v. United
States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1526-27 (10th Cir. 1991)).
220. Id. at 193.
221. Id.
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the intermediate steps. This recent trend by courts, signaling their willingness to
apply the step transaction doctrine despite profitable intermediate steps, is a potent
tool in the IRS's arsenal to combat abusive transactions.
E. The Sham Transaction and the Sham Entity
Of all the common law doctrines used to combat abusive taxpayer conduct, the
sham transaction doctrine is the most versatile of doctrines and the most
problematic. Its virtue lies in its flexibility in application across a wide range of
transactions, be they single-step transactions, multi-step transactions, personal,
partnership, corporate, estate, or gift. It is problematic, however, in the sense that it
contains no specified standard of analysis, no factors to be balanced, and no
boundaries to be observed. Yet, it is routinely invoked by courts.
The sham transaction harkens to Justice Potter Stewart's colloquial expression,
"I know it when I see it."222 Its lack of a clearly defined framework creates
abundant uncertainty in its application. Courts routinely differ in their application
of this doctrine thereby making it an unreliable tool to curb abusive taxpayer
conduct. For instance, to determine if a transaction is a sham, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals applies "a two-pronged inquiry . . . [examining whether] the
taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits
in entering the transaction, and [whether] the transaction has no economic
substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists." 223 This is in contrast
to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which examines only whether the
transaction lacks "economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits. 224
The sham transaction doctrine is a subsidiary common law doctrine and is
frequently linked with one of the remaining doctrines. The sham transaction
doctrine functions more as a declaration of conclusion rather than as a tool for
analysis. For instance, in United Parcel Serv., the court noted that the "economic-
substance doctrine, [is] also called the sham-transaction doctrine ....,225 Another
court noted that "[a] sham transaction is one that subjectively lacks a non-tax
business purpose and objectively lacks economic substance beyond procuring tax
benefits." 226 Neither of these statements is particularly helpful to an analysis. Of all
the varying common law doctrines, the sham transaction is the weakest tax
doctrine.
222. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Potter, J., concurring) ("I shall not today attempt further to
define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of obscenity] and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that.").
223. Rice's Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91-92.
224. Kirchman, 862 F.2d at 1492 (citing Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960)).
225. United Parcel Svc., 254 F.3d at 1018 (citing Kirchman, 862 F.2d at 1492).
226. River City Ranches v. C.I.R., 313 F. App'x 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Sochin v. Comm'r, 843
F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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V. THE LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN CURBING
AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING
Tax policy reflects the collective wisdom of Congress concerning fiscal
approaches to economic and to social issues. For example, congressional action has
been directed primarily to promote positive taxpayer conduct such as stimulating
investment,227 encouraging jobs creation, 228 or promoting retirement savings. 229 At
the same time, Congress has to address dubious taxpayer behavior. To that end,
Congress enacted several tax provisions to curb abusive transactions with the
objective of encouraging taxpayer compliance and minimizing the administrative
burden on the IRS. However, each one of these tax provisions contain structural
limitations which diminish their effectiveness in combating abusive taxpayer
practices and address aggressive tax planning strategies.
A. Combating Aggressive Tax Planning and Abusive Taxpayer
Conduct-Traditional Sections
Early in the history of the Code, Congress enacted two sections to deal with
abusive taxpayer practices. One section addresses acquisitions made with the intent
of avoiding or evading income tax.230 The other section deals with transfer pricing
issues. 231 A third section, added much later in the history of the Code, addresses
passive activity losses. Taxpayers however, soon learned these sections were
relatively easy to circumvent thereby limiting their efficacy.
1. Section 269: Corporate Acquisitions Made to Avoid or Evade Tax
Section 269 of the Code was enacted to prevent taxpayers from trafficking in
acquisition transactions for the purpose of accessing tax benefits. 2  This
transaction pattern generally contemplates the acquisition by one company of
another company for the purpose of exploiting the acquired company's tax
attributes. In general, the acquiring company and the acquired company will have
227. 26 U.S.C. § 179 (2006). The section 179 deduction was enacted in 1958 to encourage investment in
property and to enable a taxpayer to take an immediate tax deduction. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-866, § 204, 72 Stat. 1606 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 179).
228. 26 U.S.C. § 51(b)(3) (2010) (The Work Opportunity Tax Credit provides a $6,000.00 per employee tax
credit if a taxpayer hires certain disadvantaged workers.).
229. 26 U.S.C. § 219 (2006).
230. 26 U.S.C. § 269 (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 446 (authorizing the IRS to recharacterize a taxpayers method of
accounting if it does not "clearly reflect income"); 26 U.S.C. § 1551 (authorizing the IRS to disallow the corporate
surtax exemptions among controlled corporations unless the taxpayer can demonstrate that the transaction was not
tax motivated. A review of accounting methods and consolidated income tax rules is beyond the scope of this
article).
231. 26 U.S.C. § 482 (2006).
232. Stockman Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (D.S.D. 1971) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 78-871 (1943)) ("The Congressional Committee Reports indicate that Section 269 was 'designed to put an end
promptly to any market for, or dealings in, interests in corporations or property which have as their objective the
reduction through artifice of the income or excess profits tax liability."').
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inverted tax attributes, that when combined, minimize the overall tax burden of the
taxpayer.
The Secretary has the authority to disallow any deduction, credit or other
allowance of any taxpayer who acquires control233 of a corporation. The Secretary
may also exercise this authority if any taxpayer acquires the property of an
unrelated company with a carryover basis in the acquired property. This authority
is exercised if "the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is
evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction,
credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise
enjoy . ,,234 The income tax regulations clarify that "[t]he phrase 'evasion or
avoidance' is not limited to cases involving criminal penalties, or civil penalties for
fraud. , 2
35
To invoke the proscription of section 269, a taxpayer must engage in an
acquisition transaction, the principal purpose of which is the evasion or avoidance
of income taxes.236 Establishing an acquisition transaction is an objective
determination. However, establishing a "principal purpose" is a more difficult
challenge and involves, to some degree, a subjective determination. The income tax
regulations provide no guidance to aid taxpayers in determining what constitutes a
principal purpose. Instead, the income tax regulations declare in conclusory fashion
"[i]f the purpose to evade or avoid Federal income tax exceeds in importance any
,,237
other purpose, it is the principal purpose.
When examining for a principal purpose, one court seemed satisfied that a
stipulation of purpose by the parties sufficed to defeat section 269. The court in
Hawaiian Trust Co. stated that "a principal purpose must exceed in importance any
other purpose., 238 In this case, the court found dispositive in its inquiry of
"principal purpose" that the parties own stipulations that a tax avoidance motive
was not a controlling feature in the transaction. The court found persuasive the fact
that "[a]t the time of the acquisition of the stock ... no consideration was given by
[the purchaser] to the tax aspects of the transaction" 239 notwithstanding the
presence of tax benefits.
Courts have also held that a principal purpose is satisfied where a valid
business reason exists for the acquisition transaction. For example, in Arwood
Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,24° the IRS challenged the taxpayer's
merger of three corporations that effectively reduced the taxpayer's overall income
tax burden on the basis that the merger was entered into to avoid income taxes. The
IRS argued that the taxpayer was "not entitled to benefit from these losses because
233. For purposes of section 269, "control" means "the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 50 percent of the total value of
shares of all classes of stock of the corporation." 26 U.S.C. § 269(a)(2).
234. Id.
235. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-1(b) (as amended in 1992).
236. 26 U.S.C. § 269(a)(2).
237. Treas Reg. § 1.269-3(a)(2) (as amended in 1992).
238. Hawaiian Trust Co. v. United States, 291 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1961).
239. Id. at 766.
240. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 6 (1971), 1971 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 330.
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he believes that there was no business purpose for the merger of the companies and
that, even if there were such a purpose, the tax avoidance motives for the merger
exceeded in importance any business purpose that may have existed., 241 In
contrast, the taxpayer argued that the principal purpose of the transaction was the
acquisition of valuable intellectual property rights, and not the acquired tax
benefits.242
The court sustained the merger of the corporations and upheld the taxpayer's
use of the merged losses. The court reasoned that "[w]hether or not the principal
purpose for a given acquisition under section 269(a) is the evasion or avoidance of
income tax is essentially a question of fact, and each case must necessarily be
decided on its own merits., 243 The court added "[w]e believe, on the facts presently
before us, that the merger of [the three companies] was motivated principally by
business considerations, and we have therefore concluded that this is not a proper
case for the application of section 269[.], 244 The taxpayer's acquisition of certain
patents and know-how in this transaction sufficed to persuade the Tax Court that
the principal purpose of the merger was business motivated. 245 The Tax Court
rejected the tax avoidance argument advanced by the IRS.
Additionally, the Arwood court rejected the IRS's contention that the
taxpayer's choice of structure suggested a tax avoidance motive because the
method chosen enabled the taxpayer to access the carryover of the operating
losses.246 The court remarked "[w]e do not believe that, whenever the method
chosen in a given case to effect an acquisition is one which assures favorable tax
results, we must necessarily conclude that the principal purpose of the transaction
is tax avoidance.,
247
"The objective of Section 269 is to nullify tax avoidance schemes[]248
However, the effectiveness of section 269 as a tool for combating abusive tax
transactions is limited because it triggers two prongs. Both prongs can be readily
sidestepped by taxpayers. First, there must be an "acquisition" transaction with
control.249 Taxpayers can easily structure transactions to avoid triggering the
control prong. Second, the transaction must have the avoidance or evasion of taxes
as its principal purpose. Courts seem amenable in accepting a relatively low
purpose threshold in satisfaction of this requirement as demonstrated by the case
law. 25
0
241. Id. at *49.
242. Id.
243. Id. at *50.
244. Id. at *51.
245. Arwood Corp., 1971 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 330, at *51.
246. Id. at *60-61.
247. Id. at *61. ("The merger in the instant case was designed to permit the deduction of the carryovers, in
the event that such deduction would prove to be permissible. We think that arranging the merger in a manner that
produces the most favorable tax results is simply intelligent business planning.").
248. Younker Bros., Inc. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 202, 206 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
249. 26 U.S.C. § 269(a)(2).
250. See, e.g., Hawaiian Trust Co., 291 F.2d at 766 (accepting the parties' stipulation that at the time of the
transaction, the taxpayer did not consider the tax consequences).
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2. Section 482: Transfer Pricing
The transfer pricing rules,25' commonly referred to as section 482, authorize
the Commissioner to make reallocations of income and expense when it determines
an abuse in transfer pricing. Transfer pricing practices have been a concern of
Congress since the earliest days of the Code. Transfer pricing is defined as "the
method by which companies allocate taxable income among individual business
units[.],, 252 The transfer pricing rules were enacted by Congress to combat abusive
practices by taxpayers who would shift income and expenses between commonly
controlled companies with the effect of reducing the overall income tax burden of
the enterprise. The predecessor of the current transfer pricing rules 253 "reflected
congressional concerns about 'the arbitrary shifting of profits among related
businesses, particularly in the case of subsidiary corporations organized as foreign
trade corporations.' 25 4 In W. Braun Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confirmed that "[t]he congressional
purpose of section 482 was to prevent the use of controlled corporations to evade
or avoid otherwise payable taxes by means of shifting profits or by other financial
devices. The courts have given broad scope to the Commissioner's discretion in
making reallocations of income.' '211 Courts applying section 482 endeavor "to
examine carefully the relationship between the controlled corporations to ascertain
whether there was a 'sound business purpose' served by the use of the other
corporation or whether the transaction was a mere sham to effect tax evasion.
256
Section 482 expressly grants to the IRS the authority to reallocate among
commonly controlled organizations, items of "gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances ... if [the IRS] determines that such ... allocation is necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses., 257 "The two primary elements which must
exist to sustain a section 482 allocation are the existence of commonly controlled
companies and the earning of income by certain of these companies which in the
absence of the Commissioner's reallocation would not adequately be reflected in
[their taxable income]. 258
The theory behind section 482 recognizes that taxpayers with multiple
organizations under common control may maintain a separate accounting system
for each individual entity. The presence of two or more entities, each with its
separate accounting systems, enables the shifting of income and expense items
251. 26 U.S.C. § 482 (2006).
252. United States v. Bell, No. 94-20342, 1994 WL 665295, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also OECD,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS, (1995)
("Transfer prices are the prices at which an enterprise transfers physical goods and intangible property or provides
services to associated enterprises.").
253. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 227, 260 (1921).
254. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 289, 293 n.12 (1983) (quoting S. Rep. No. 275-67, at 20
(1921)).
255. 396 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1968).
256. Id.
257. 26 U.S.C. § 482.
258. Local Fin. Corp. v. Comm'r, 407 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1969).
31
: The 100-Year Onslaught on the Tax Code
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2012
Barry Law Review
between entities. This concern became prominent as entities began to segment their
activities across divisions, subsidiaries, and international boundaries. As a result,
each organization accounts for its own particular item of income and expense.
"Separate accounting [facilitates] the risk that a [taxpayer] will manipulate
transfers of value among its components to minimize its total tax liability. To guard
against such manipulation, transactions between affiliated corporations must be
scrutinized to ensure that they are reported on an "'arm's-length' basis .... ,259
The regulations provide for several methods of scrutinizing the transfer price of
an item between organizations with common control. The dominant principle
governing transferring pricing is establishing a comparable uncontrolled
transaction. 260 This approach effectively establishes a hypothetical third party price
for the good, service or intangible at issue.
However, as a tool to combat aggressive tax planning, section 482 is limited in
application. First, section 482 requires a commonly controlled group of
organizations. Second, it requires allocations of income or expense that fail to
clearly reflect income.261 Unlike section 269, section 482 contains no clear
definition of control. Instead, the regulations provide that the term "controlled" as
used in section 482
includes any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally
enforceable or not, and however exercisable or exercised,
including control resulting from the actions of two or more
taxpayers acting in concert or with a common goal or purpose. It is
the reality of the control that is decisive, not its form or the mode
of its exercise.
262
The regulations add that "[a] presumption of control arises if income or
deductions have been arbitrarily shifted., 263 Defining control in such an ambiguous
fashion invites uncertainty.
As an enforcement tool, section 482 is a difficult section to apply. Although the
statute itself is short, the regulations are long and complex. It contains many
abstractions and ambiguities which only add to uncertainty about the appropriate
standard for application. For example, in Xilinx, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the court criticized the IRS for adopting inconsistent positions with the
income tax regulations. 264 Xilinx, Inc. dealt with a corporation taxpayer who
entered into a cost sharing agreement with its foreign subsidiary, where the
259. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 305 (1994); see also 26 U.S.C. § 482;
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (2009) (explaining "arm's length" standard) (codified at 26 C.F.R.§ 1.482-1(b)).
260. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b-d) (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(b-d)) (discussing factors to consider in
making comparison to an uncontrolled transaction).
261. Section 446 requires taxpayers to adopt a method of accounting that "clearly reflect[s] income." 26
U.S.C. § 446(b).
262. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(4) (2009) (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(i)(4)).
263. Id.
264. 125 T.C. 37, 55 (2005), aff'd, 598 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court admonished the IRS for
inconsistent application of regulation 1.482-1 (b)(1) versus 1.482-7(d)(1)).
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corporation deducted the whole cost of employee stock options (ESO) rather than
shared it with the subsidiary.265 The IRS tried to argue that under regulation section
1.482-7, Xilinx and its subsidiary are both controlled participants who should share
all operating expenses including the ESOs paid for employees' research and
development services.2 66 The court evaluated the arguments and determined that
the Commissioner's allocations were inconsistent with the Arm's-Length Standard
Mandated by 1.482-1, because the cost sharing agreement did not establish whether
the ESOs were a cost to be shared while unrelated parties would not share the
spread or grant date value.267
The IRS has also indicated in an administrative announcement that it would not
pursue 482 when dealing with shelter transactions. In Rev. Rul. 2003-96,268 the IRS
discussed whether section 482 applies to unrelated parties engaged in a lease
stripping transaction. The IRS held:
[T]he fact that unrelated parties engage in a transaction does not by
itself evidence the type of control necessary to satisfy the "acting
in concert or with a common goal or purpose" requirement of [the
income tax regulations], 269 regardless of whether such transaction
may be viewed as having arbitrarily shifted income between the
otherwise unrelated parties. An application of [the income tax
regulations] 270 to this type of situation would be inconsistent with
the policies underlying section 482, which provides for allocations
between or among organizations, trades or businesses "owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests. 271
The principal reason given is that without objective evidence of common
control, section 482 could not be invoked.272 The import of Rev. Rul. 2003-96 is
that taxpayers can interpret this ruling favorably when considering potential
transfer pricing application in the context of tax shelter transactions.
265. Id. at 39-40.
266. Id. at 52-53.
267. Id. at 59-62
268. Rev. Rul. 2003-96, 2003-2 C.B. 386.
269. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(4) (as amended in 2009) (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(i)(4)) (the regulation
provides in relevant part, "[c]ontrolled includes any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable
or not, and however exercisable or exercised, including control resulting from the actions of two or more taxpayers
acting in concert or with a common goal or purpose. It is the reality of the control that is decisive, not its form or
the mode of its exercise").
270. Id.
271. Rev. Rul. 2003-96, supra note 268.
272. See I.R.S. Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334; see also FSA 200013004 (Dec. 23, 1999) (employing an
objective analysis); FSA 200015024 (Jan. 11, 2000) (same); FSA 200218022 (Jan. 31, 2002) (same); FSA
200206006 (Oct. 29, 2001) (same); and FSA 200237016 (Sept. 13, 2002) (same).
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3. Section 469: Passive Activity Losses
Prior to 1986, taxpayers were able to reduce their overall tax liability by
deducting passive losses against active income. In 1986, Congress changed the
ability of taxpayers to do so by adding the passive activity rules ("section 469',)273
to the Code. Section 469 contains the statutory framework for limiting the
deduction of passive activity losses against active income. It allows the deduction
of passive losses, but only against passive income. As a result, active income can
no longer be reduced by passive losses.
A passive activity "means any activity which involves the conduct of any trade
or business, and in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. 274 The
taxpayer "materially participat[es] in an activity only if the taxpayer is involved in
the operations of the activity on a basis which is regular, continuous, and
substantial. 275 The income tax regulations enumerate seven standards taxpayers
can use to establish material participation.276 The scope of the passive activity
rules applies to "any individual, estate, or trust, [and] any closely held C-
,,277
corporation .... However, in the case of a limited partnership interest, a special
per se rule provides that "no interest in a limited partnership as a limited partner
shall be treated as an interest with respect to which a taxpayer materially
participates.
278
Section 469 is used to curtail abusive taxpayer practices by those who organize
and operate their business activity either through an individual, corporate, estate or
trust form. However, three recent cases exempt LLC's and LLP's from the
application of the passive activity loss rules. In Gregg v. United States, 2 79 Garnett
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Thompson v. United States,28 courts
held resoundingly in favor of the taxpayer who used these hybrid entities to
successfully bypass the application of section 469. One court reasoned "absent
explicit regulatory provision, we conclude that the legislative purposes of the
special rule of section 469(h)(2) are more nearly served by treating L.L.P. and
L.L.C. members as general partners for [purposes of section 469.] ,282
It is not entirely clear why neither Congress nor the IRS have failed to act in
addressing the coverage of section 469 as it applies to hybrid entities such as LLCs,
LLPs, and LLLPs. However, what is clear is that by ignoring the advent of these
hybrid entities, taxpayers are left with a glaring and obvious opportunity to
structure transactions and thereby avoid triggering section 469.
273. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2233 (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. § 469).
274. 26 U.S.C. § 469(c).
275. Id. § 469(h)(1).
276. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a), (e)(2) (as amended in 1992) (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T) (the
regulation provides seven standards. In the case of a limited partnership, only factors 1, 5, and 6 are available).
277. 26 U.S.C. § 469(a)(2).
278. Id. § 469(h)(2).
279. 186 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (D. Or. 2000) (holding that LLC is not subject to section 469).
280. 132 T.C. 368 (2009) (holding that LLC and LLP are not subject to section 469).
281. 87 Fed. Cl. 728 (2009).
282. Garnett, 132 T.C. at 370.
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B. Combating Abusive Taxpayer Conduct-The Anti-abuse Sections
"[T]he large volume of cases generated by tax shelter examinations during the
late 1970s and early 1980s [prompted the IRS] and the Tax Court [to] develop
procedures to streamline the litigation process, and reduce the costs ... in resolving
[tax shelter] disputes . , Additionally, Congress amended the Code by adding
two new anti-abuse provisions as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 to curb
abusive tax shelters.284 The first provision required "[a]ny tax shelter organizer [to]
register the tax shelter with the Secretary .... ,285 The second provision imposed a
list maintenance requirement on "[a]ny person who organizes any potentially
abusive tax shelter or sells any interest in such a shelter . . . [to] identify[] each
person [to whom] an interest in such shelter" was sold.286 Unfortunately, these
provisions proved to be nothing more than statutory decoys.
Twenty years later, "[iun October 2002, the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs began
an investigation into the development, marketing, and implementation of abusive
tax shelters by accountants, lawyers, financial advisors, and bankers. 2 87 In its
report to Congress, the Subcommittee related that:
The sale of potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters is a lucrative
business in the Unites States, and some professional firms such as
accounting firms, banks, law firms, and investment advisory firms
have been major participants in the development, mass marketing,
and implementation of generic tax products sold to multiple
clients.288
The 2002 Subcommittee report is particularly disturbing in light of the earlier
action taken by Congress in 1984 to address "potentially abusive tax shelters."
289
The 1984 provisions were enacted by Congress "for the purpose of providing the
IRS with means to better monitor tax shelters, and, consequently, to deter abusive
tax shelters that can adversely impact public revenues. Before 1984, no systematic
information was available to assist the IRS in identifying the shelters that should be
investigated."
290
283. Hartman v. Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1448, at *6 (2008) (One of the changes included creating "the
Tax Shelter Branch in the National Office to oversee tax shelter litigation across the country and to organize and
supervise individual tax shelter projects").
284. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 677-78 (1984) (codified as amended
at 26 U.S.C. § 6111); § 142(a), 98 Stat. at 681.
285. Id. § 141(a).
286. Id. § 142(a).
287. U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note 104, at 6.
288. Id
289. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, supra note 284, § 142(b). Former Code section 6112(b) defined a
potentially abusive tax shelter as "(1) any tax shelter . . . with respect to which registration is required under
section 6111, and (2) any entity, investment plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement which is of a type
which the Secretary determines by regulations as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion."
290. United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 2003).
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The 1984 provisions imposed registration requirements and list maintenance
requirements on taxpayers and tax shelter promoters. The registration requirements
compelled "any tax shelter organizer [to] register the tax shelter with the
Secretary., 291 A tax shelter organizer was defined to include "the person principally
responsible for organizing the tax shelter ... any other person who participated in
the organization of the tax shelter, and ... any person participating in the sale or
management of the investment .. .,,2 Additionally, the list maintenance
requirement obligated "any person who organizes any potentially abusive tax
shelter or sells any interest in such a shelter. . ." to maintain a list of participants.
293
However, taxpayers and their advisors were able to successfully structure
transactions to circumvent the application of these two sections. As a result,
taxpayers engaged in numerous abusive transactions including: "using a loan
assumption agreement to claim an inflated basis in assets acquired from another
party[,] . . . improperly shifting basis from one party to another[,] . . . [and]
deferring tax on income from investments used to fund deferred executive
compensation., 294 High net worth individuals, who were not subject to the
proscription of the anti-abuse sections, engaged in abusive transactions marketed
under various names like son of boss transactions 295 and basis shifting
transactions.296 Additionally, corporations and individuals alike, frequently utilized
partnerships, S-Corporations, and trusts structures to avoid triggering sections of
the anti-abuse provisions. Novel and then emerging entity structures such as LLP's
and LLLP's were also deployed to facilitate questionable transactions.
In response to the abusive practices reported by the Committee, Congress
amended the Code by adding new code section 6707A 297 as part of the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004.298 The new provision sought "to stop abusive tax
shelters ... by imposing a penalty for a taxpayer's failure to disclose participation
in certain tax-avoidance transactions known as reportable transactions.,
299
"Congress also sought to strengthen the IRS by providing it with additional
enforcement tools to induce compliance with the reportable transaction disclosure
regulations. 30 °
Section 6707A imposes a penalty on "any person who fails to include on any
return or statement any information with respect to a reportable transaction .... "301
The penalty amounts vary depending on the class of penalty and the type of
taxpayer. In the case of a natural person, the maximum penalty is $50,000 for a
291. 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (a) (1984) (amended 2004).
292. Id. § 611 1(d)(1)(A-C) (1984).
293. Id. § 6112(a) (1984).
294. I.R.S. Daily Tax Rep. 55 DTR L-20, 2002 WL 429750 (Mar. 21, 2002).
295. Id. (citing I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255).
296. I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129.
297. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 811(a), 118 Stat. 1575 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6707A (2010)) (the Act was effective for returns and statements due after October 22,
2004 and which were not filed before such date).
298. Id.
299. Smith v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. 424,427 (2009).
300. Id.
301. 26 U.S.C. § 6707A(a).
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reportable transaction and $100,000 for listed transactions.30 2 For all other
taxpayers, the penalty is $100,000 for a reportable transaction and $200,000 for
listed transactions.30 3 A reportable transaction is defined as a transaction
determined by the Secretary "as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion
304
and a listed transaction is "a transaction specifically identified . . . as a tax
avoidance transaction ....
As part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Congress also added
section 6662A 30 6 to the Code. This new section imposes a twenty percent penalty
on the understatement if such understatement is due to a reportable transaction. The
penalty increases to thirty percent if the taxpayer fails to adequately disclose the
reportable transaction.30 7
Congress also strengthened the provisions governing commercial tax planners
by redefining and increasing the scope of coverage of the anti-abuse provisions.30 8
The initial scope of the 1984 legislation applied to a "tax shelter organizer" which
included "the person principally responsible for organizing the tax shelter. 30 9 The
expanded 2004 standard now looks to a "material advisor" which is defined as
any person who provides any material aid, assistance, or advice
with respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling,
implementing, insuring, or carrying out any reportable transaction,
and who directly or indirectly derives gross income in excess of
the threshold amount (or such other amount as may be prescribed
by the Secretary) for such aid, assistance, or advice.31 °
This change in definition broadened the scope of persons who are subject to the
Code's reporting, disclosure, and list maintenance requirements. Under the
amended rules, "[e]ach material adviser[,] with respect to any reportable
transaction[,] shall make a return [disclosing] information identifying and
describing the transaction, information describing any potential tax benefits
expected to result for the transaction and such other information as the Secretary
may prescribe."3 '
Congress also amended the list maintenance obligations of the 1984 legislation.
The new 2004 standard now requires that "each material advisor[,] with respect to
any reportable transaction[,] shall maintain a list identifying each person to whom
such advisor actor as a material advisor and . . . such other information as the
302. Id. § 6707A(b)(2).
303. Id.
304. Id. § 6707A(c)(1).
305. Id. § 6707A(c)(2).
306. § 812(a), 118 Stat. 1418 at 1577 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6662A (2011)) (this section was
also made effective for tax years ending after October 22, 2004).
307. 26 U.S.C. § 6662A(c).
308. Id. § 6111.
309. 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (e) (1984).
310. 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (b)(1) (2006).
311. Id. § 6111(a).
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Secretary may require."3" 2 The former list maintenance obligations imposed its
requirements on "any person who organizes any potentially abusive tax shelter or
sells any interest in such a shelter ... ,33 The enhanced list maintenance
obligations broaden the scope to include any person who provides "aid, assistance,
or advice" and who receives a payment in excess of a threshold amount.
31 4
However, even with these reforms, the tax laws may not be a sufficient
deterrent. First, it is undeniable that for a segment of taxpayers, the prescribed
penalties undoubtedly will be a sufficient deterrent. There remains a segment of
taxpayers for whom a $50,000, $100,000, or even a maximum $200,000 penalty
will constitute a sufficient financial deterrent.
Second, the rules 31 5 fail to address the proverbial cat-and-mouse game, namely,
the pursuit of structural designs by taxpayers intent on avoiding tax or producing
substantial tax benefits. Finally, what is most unsettling from an administration
perspective is the ex-post nature of IRS announcements. Current IRS practice is to
publish a notice identifying transactions it determines to be abusive.31 6 The IRS
follows a practice of publishing transactions which it "determine[s] . . . to be
avoidance transaction[s].,, 317 The IRS determination is made on an ex-post basis
thereby lagging, sometimes by a considerable amount of time, the containment and
prohibition of abusive transactions. This approach is to be criticized because it does
nothing to combat the vast inventory of tax products. For example, the
Subcommittee Report noted that "KPMG had provided... [a] list of more than 500
active tax products for various tax practice groups, which were intended to be
offered to multiple clients for a fee.",31 8 The elimination of one tax product, ten tax
products, or even forty tax products as was done by the IRS in Notice 2009-59319
fails to address the prospective application of the remaining tax products.
Taxpayers are using a combination of increasingly complex financial and
structural arrangements, and ambiguities in the law in ways never envisioned by
Congress when the tax laws were enacted. One "sad additional fact is that all
parties to these transactions know there is substantial likelihood that the device
employed, including the imaginative assertion of the proper factual setting, will not
be uncovered by IRS agents even if the corporation is audited .... Preventing
the erosion of the tax base, ensuring compliance with the tax laws, and diminishing
312. Id.
313. 26 U.S.C. § 6112(a) (1984).
314. 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (b)(1) (2006).
315. Id. §§ 6707A, 6662A, 6111,6112.
316. See I.R.S. Notice 2010-33, 2010-1 C.B. 609 (listing over 40 such tax positions).
317. See I.R.S. Notice 2009-59, 2009-2 C.B. 170 (identifying listed transactions); see also I.R.S. Notice
2009-55, 2009-2 C.B. 170 (identifying transactions of interest).
318. U.S. TAx SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note 104, at 79 n.297 (KPMG's tax shelter work led to a high
profile prosecution: KPMG has admitted that.it engaged in a fraud that generated at least $11 billion dollars in
phony tax losses which, according to court papers, cost the United States at least $2.5 billion dollars in evaded
taxes. I.R.S. News Release IR 2005-83 (Aug. 29, 2005)).
319. I.R.S. Notice 2009-59, 2009-2 C.B. 170.
320. Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery: The Role of Penalties in the U.S. Tax Law in the Aftermath
of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 381,411 (2006) (quoting the Statement of
Stefan Tucker, on behalf of the Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, Mar. 10, 1999).
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confidence in the U.S. tax system are the keystone principles of effective tax
policy. The time is upon Congress for swift and decisive action to protect the
further erosion of the domestic tax base.
VI. PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION
"[T]he dissent is often more than just a plea; it safeguards the
integrity of the . . . decision-making process by keeping the
majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its
decision.,
321
Tax policy touches upon a most fundamental question, "What is the role of
government?" Trying to find a consensus on this question, let alone unanimity
from a group of individuals contemplating its significance, is a daunting exercise.
Invariably, seemingly irreconcilable questions over funding levels and
distributional burdens will follow.
"Happily for the United States, most people pay their taxes. More happily,
most pay out of a sense of conscience and perhaps even public spirit ... with the
threat of fines and prison only rather remotely in the back of their minds. 322
However, tax protesters and aggressive tax planners seemed undeterred by
Congressional efforts to curb abusive practices. Congress must address these
taxpayers more forcefully.
A perilous culture of tax avoidance is entrenched in American society. The
attitude of avoidance is understandable when one contrasts the historical principle
of individual freedom from government intrusion 323 against the modem condition
of tax collections. In 2010, the federal government collected $1.9 trillion.324
Individuals, estates, and trusts contributed forty-three percent of this amount,
payroll taxes contributed 43.7 percent, and corporations contributed 9.6 percent.325
If measured on a gross domestic product (GDP) basis, U.S. tax collections would
rank ninth, according to the World Bank ranking system, just ahead of India's
reported 2010 GDP of $1.7 trillion.326 Taxpayers clearly have a right to plan their
transactions to minimize their tax burdens. However, taxpayers do not have a right
to pursue a frivolous claim and then seek to defend their frivolous position in the
face of settled law. Likewise, taxpayers should not have an unqualified right to
craft an aggressive tax position which has not been endorsed by Congress, nor to
base their tax position upon authority which is questionable.
U.S. tax policy makers and tax administrators must continually reevaluate their
efforts to addrdss the abuses that both tax protesters and aggressive tax planning
321. William J. Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986).
322. Gardellini, 545 F.3d at 1097 (Williams, J., dissenting).
323. See generally PAINE, supra note 37.
324. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DATA BOOK 2010 3 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/1Odatabk.pdf.
325. See id. at Table 1.
326. See THE WORLD BANK, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2010 (2011), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (ranking countries by GDP) (last visited May 25, 2012).
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inflict on the system of tax administration. This will require reexamining the tax
policies of simplicity, efficiency, fairness, and revenue sufficiency 327 in the face of
a globalized economy. The emergence of developing economies is exerting
additional strain on U.S. tax administration as foreign jurisdictions make it
increasingly attractive for U.S. taxpayers to access foreign tax benefits.328 We live
in an era of increased financial sophistication, porous economic borders, and a
complex income tax structure. Any meaningful reform concerning abusive
taxpayer practices must take into consideration that U.S. taxpayers operate in a
global environment where the tax policies of foreign jurisdictions now influence
how U.S. taxpayers respond.
Future reforms must consider that government appropriations for tax
administration will decrease. For example, "IRS's appropriations in FY [fiscal
year] 2011 were reduced by 0.2 percent in nominal dollars and by more when
increased costs are taken into account as compared with the previous year.,
329
Funding levels for future years face an uncertain future and come at a time when
"the IRS has been given more and more tasks, but.., is not receiving the resources
it needs to fulfill these tasks . . ,,330 A reduction in funding levels coupled with
continuing taxpayer abuse and aggressive tax planning will inevitably increase the
burden for tax administrators.
A reduction in funding levels will also affect the IRS's audit function and
strain IRS operations. A 2010 taxpayer survey question asked survey participants
"How much influence does... '[f]ear of an audit' . . . have on whether you report
and pay your taxes honestly? '331 Thirty-five percent of the participants answered
affirmatively that "[f]ear of an audit" had a great deal of influence on their
reporting activity. 332 This suggests that sixty-five percent of the population is
undeterred by IRS audit efforts. Consider also that fewer than two percent of
taxpayers are audited annually 333 and the environment for abusive taxpayer conduct
becomes self-evident.
Tax benefits exist because they were intentionally structured by Congress and
thereby reflect congressional intent in a particular area. Some tax benefits exist
because of the creativity of planners, the necessity of commerce, and the desire of
327. MINARIK, supra note 7.
328. Rachelle Y. Holmes, Deconstructing the Rules of Corporate Tax, 25 AKRON TAX J. 1, 3 (2010)
("[T]here is growing evidence that our current tax system is not ideally structured to deal with the challenges of an
internationally integrated economy.").
329. IR-2011-71, National Taxpayer Advocate Submits Mid-Year Report to Congress; Identifies Priority
Challenges and Issues for Upcoming Year, I.R.S. (June 29, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
0,,id=241123,00.html.
330. Id.
331. IRS Oversight Board, 2010 Taxpayer Attitude Survey, 5 (Jan. 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/
reports/201 1/IRSOB%202010%20Taxpayer/20Attitude%20Survey.pdf
332. Id. (Twenty-nine percent answered "[s]omewhat of an influence", sixteen percent answered "[vlery
little influence, nineteen percent answered "[n]ot at all an influence" and two percent did not know, answer, or
respond.).
333. IRS, ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS FOR FY 2010, at 2, available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-utl/2010 enforcement results.pdf.
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most individuals to minimize the burden of taxation. 334 Some tax benefits exist
because the Service has not addressed the deficiency in the tax laws. 335 The
Supreme Court's rule that "an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace
and that the burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the
taxpayer ' 336 is a cardinal principle in tax law. Subjecting tax benefits to increased
scrutiny is reasonable.
Tax protesters and aggressive tax planning both present a material threat to
effective tax administration because they touch upon the foundational pillars of tax
policy. 337 The political rhetoric of closing loopholes, enacting income tax reforms,
and simplifying the tax code is a national distraction from the central issue-
What tax policy should Congress pursue?
With respect to frivolous returns, Congress should increase the penalty once
again to a meaningful level and with substantial consequences. The evidence
indicates that the current penalties have not sufficiently deterred tax protesters from
continuing to engage in protester activities. Moreover, Congress should conduct a
study to determine whether compensated taxpayer advocacy facilitators should be
required to register, and to disclose to the IRS, course materials and participants.
338
The registration and disclosure could be done within a reasonable period of time
before or after the organized event. This initiative will help expose protester sites
masquerading as legitimate taxpayer assistance forums. Requiring the registration
of tax forum facilitators, their clients, and the forums will help the IRS identify
individuals likely to engage in tax protester activities.
With respect to aggressive tax planning transactions, Congress should enact a
statute which requires taxpayers engaged in aggressive tax planning transactions to
disclose, with the filed income tax return, their filing position and supporting
authority. Specifically, taxpayers have to disclose that they have engaged in a
transaction designed to significantly reduce their tax liability and include the
relevant authorities supporting the tax position. Taxpayers shall demonstrate that
the transaction undertaken is both intended and permitted pursuant to established
authority.339 "Intended" in the sense that a reasonable inference from the
congressional record approving the application of the tax law to the subject
transaction is possible, and "permitted" in the sense that the relevant authorities, be
it Congress or the courts, affirm the application. Adding income thresholds as a
334. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, Table 9a (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/ I Idatabk.pdf.
335. Carrie M. Dupic, Comment: The SUV Tax Loophole: Today's Quintessential Suburban Passenger
Vehicle Becomes Small Businesses' Quintessential Tax Break, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 669 (2005).
336. INDOPCO, Inc. v. C.I.R., 503 U.S. 79, 84, (1992) (citing Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r), 319 U.S.
590, 593 (1943); Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,
440 (1934)).
337. MINARIK, supra note 7 (Those pillars are "efficiency, equity, revenue sufficiency, and simplicity.").
338. See IRS Form, Referral Form for Reporting Abusive Tax Promotions and/or Promoters, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/referralform reportingabusiveschemes.pdf (for voluntary disclosure by third
parties).
339. The regulations under section 6662 may be instructive. "Authority" includes several sources of law,
such as statutes, court cases, legislative history, and regulations, although none of these is particularly relevant if
"materially distinguishable" on its facts. See Treas Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii).
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safeguard to exclude low dollar value transactions should be considered. 340 A
failure to comply with the disclosure requirements shall result in a disallowance of
the claimed tax benefits. The term "aggressive tax planning" means using any
entity, device, or arrangement that lacks a material non-tax benefit in combination
with any domestic or foreign law to significantly reduce the income tax liability of
the taxpayer in the absence of permitted authority for such tax position.
Additionally, the statute of limitations shall be automatically extended to six
years for taxpayers engaged in an aggressive tax planning transaction if not
properly disclosed.34 An extended statute of limitations already exists for failing to
report a listed transaction, 342 as well as for omissions of income.3 43 Extending the
statute of limitations for aggressive tax planning is justified when one considers the
challenges raised by the increased sophistication of transactions, the geographic
dispersion of taxpayer information, and the decrease in IRS personnel. Moreover,
extending the statute of limitations is reasonable when one balances the limited
resources of the IRS against the fact that "many if not most tax practitioners view.
. it as their right to seek out and exploit loopholes in the way the provisions apply
to innovative structures.",
344
As noted by one court, "[e]ven the smartest drafters of legislation and
regulation cannot be expected to anticipate every device., 345 However, by
observing tax policy fundamentals, most tax laws can be written within the bounds
of reasonableness, thereby narrowing the range of honest dispute. Our elected
officials must refrain from engaging in the rhetoric of tax protesting under the
guise of tax reform as evidenced by the "Tax Code Termination Act".3 46 Rather,
they must embark upon a decisive course of action that confronts anticipated
challenges while promoting the fundamental principles of tax policy.
340. For example, transactions with anticipated tax savings greater than 2 million dollars would be subject
to the new statute.
341. Limited disclosure is required under current UTP rules for corporations. This proposal extends and
expands disclosure requirements by all taxpayers-individuals, corporations, estates, and trusts.
342. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c )(10) (2010).
343. Id. § 6501(e) A six-year statute exists if the taxpayer fails to report 25% or more of their gross income.
344. Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying
Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 668 (2006).
345. ASA Investerings P'ship, 201 F.3d at 513.
346. H.R. 462, 112th Cong. (2011).
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